![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 13 to 37 of 55. Go back in thread:
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:25:19
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 16, 2005, at 18:11:26
Okay so... Just in case Zeugma or someone hits the boards... I have many confusions around meaning... Philosophy of language is really very hard (IMO).
That is just by way of saying... That I don't really know what I'm talking about so if it is hard to understand that may well be because it is ununderstandable, incoherant, or just plain wrong...
Two dimensional modal semantics / logic in particular...
The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
So for example...
Take a sentance 'There is water on twin earth'.
Lets specify twin earth (there are a variety of thought experiments that specify a variety of conditions on twin earth).On my version of twin earth there is no H2O. There is watery stuff that fills the lakes etc, but that stuff is xyz and let us grant that H2O does not = xyz.
Now lets evaluate the utterance 'there is water on twin earth' by going modal (considering another possible world):
With respect to extension the utterance is false: there is no h2O on twin earth.
With respect to intension the utterance is true: there is watery stuff that fills the lakes etc.You can do all kinds of funny stuff with indexicals by evaluating their truth / falsity in modal contexts (across other possible worlds):
'I am here now'.
This statement is necessarily true. It is true in all possible worlds. For anyone who speaks the utterance the utterance cannot be false.
What is curious about the expression is that while we want to say that it has a standard meaning it is also true that there is no standard dennotation.
'I' is indexical because what the term dennotes changes as a function of context of utterance. If I say 'I' I dennote a_k, if you say 'I' you dennote Damos etc.
'Here' is indexical because where the term dennotes changes as a function of context of utterance. If I say 'here' it refers to where I am right now.
And 'Now' is the same...
Indexicals have a standard meaning 'I' refers to whoever is speaking now etc... But the referent changes as a function from intension to context.
'I am here now' is necessarily true. It is true for all speakers at all times at all places across all possible worlds.
But the referents (extensions) vary across different possible worlds.
It is necessarily true because it doesn't say anything in particular about the world at all.
It is true that I am here now.
But it is also possible that I be somewhere else now.Argh.
I'm all confused already...
I'm just talking really...
;-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:41:51
In reply to Re: the meaning of meaning, posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:25:19
I am getting there... I am getting there...
So... The thought is that initially we picked out samples of water by its qualitative properties. We knew to dub something water when it appeared to be 'that watery stuff'. The clear liquid that falls from the sky, fills the lakes, is drinkable, potable etc etc. Thats how we identify whether something is correctly called 'water' or not.
But then on with the march of science... And the scientists tell us 'that watery stuff that falls from the sky etc has a common essential nature and that essential nature is that it is H2O.
And so the scientists fix the reference of the term. The thought is that now we know the essential nature of the stuff that we initially refered to via its qualitative properties. If the qualitative properties come apart from the essential properties (as they do most clearly on twin earth) then the essential properties take priority with respect to reference.
So: Initially we go via qualitative properties. Scientists discover a correlation between qualitative properties and essential properties. An identity claim is made (Water = H2O) and from thereon the essential properties fix the reference.
Kripke maintains that identity claims are necessary. Once we discover a correlation on the actual world and make an identity claim then that identity claim is true on all possible worlds.
Now what is interesting...Initially we identify mental states like pains, tickles, emotions etc by their qualitative properties. Then on with the march of science and scientists discover (or more properly WILL discover) correlations between certain neural patterns and qualitative states. The scientists want to make an identity claim 'mental state x = brain state y'. Now if the identity claim is right then this identity claim is necessary. What that means is that mental state x would = brain state y across all possible worlds. And when the qualitative properties come apart from the essential properties then the dennotation follows the essential properties.
And this is a problem quite a few people struggle with...
Kripke says that clearly it is false that mental states are identicle to brain states across all possible worlds. Clearly it is possible for beings without brains to have mental states. Thus he maintains that the identity claim between mental states and brain states is necessarily false.
Hmm. Hrm...
The trouble is... Knowing whether we have an identity claim or not to start with. If we DO have an identity then it is true in all possible worlds... If we DO NOT have an identity then it is false in all possible worlds... I think you are also allowed contingent identity (true on some worlds and false on others) - but I'm not sure whether that counts as identity...
Any way... Going counterfactual (considering other possible worlds) isn't like observing these possible worlds through a telescope and seeing what is there (credit to Kripke). It is an intuition pump. To get us thinking about what is and is not possible. And the trouble is that it is perfectly possible for rational people to disagree. So the thought experiments aren't terribly rationally persuasive much of the time (nobody is going to change their mind based on them). It is very controversial what if any use 2 d modal logic is...
I think... That sometimes... Actually most times... The qualitative properties are what interests us. We are interested in essential properties only insofar as there is some kind of lawful connection between essential properties and qualitative properties.
The business of science is to explain and predict things on the qualitative level. To explain our experience of the world.
But thats just my opinion.
And I don't really know what I'm talking about...
Posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 20:49:50
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 17:41:51
Sorry kiddo, but I'm gonna have to print all this out and work my way through it. Hate how work keeps getting in the way of important stuff :-)
Gosh I just wish I had read something, anything that would help me contribute to this in some meaningful way. I love watching you think stuff through and examine what you've thought and said and then expand, clarify, or even retrace your steps and then move forward again. Whether you realise it or not, I learn a lot from what you post and really appreciate it.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 21:28:02
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 20:49:50
> I'm gonna have to print all this out and work my way through it.
You don't have to. Really. Its just me talking really. A lot of it doesn't make very much sense. Not sure whether reflecting on it will help it make any more sense.
Posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Damos, posted by alexandra_k on August 17, 2005, at 21:28:02
Whether it's just you talking and whether it makes sense or not isn't what matters. It's written by someone I care a whole bunch about and it's interesting - that's what matters. Anyway, hadn't you already guessed that I like listening when you 'just talk' :-)
Posted by Phillipa on August 17, 2005, at 22:16:48
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
Ahhhh Alexandra Remember my post about Babbleland? That's where i want to live. And the Magic pill? Caused quite a stir on PBabble. Fondly, Phillipa
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:03
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by Phillipa on August 17, 2005, at 22:16:48
> Ahhhh Alexandra Remember my post about Babbleland? That's where i want to live.
:-)
Yeah, thats right.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 17, 2005, at 21:58:46
> Anyway, hadn't you already guessed that I like listening when you 'just talk' :-)
Okay :-)
Just don't stress trying to make sense of something that probably doesn't make a lot of sense
Posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:34:19
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
Posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain..., posted by alexandra_k on August 18, 2005, at 18:33:54
I was just reading that "new cells are only generated in two areas of the brain, the olfactory bulb, that governs the sense of smell, and the hippocamus, an area important to learning." Apparently all the others are as old as we are. Also "the adult brain contains stem cells, meaning it may be possible to stimulate the brain to grow new tissue after injury." Never knew about the first bit - that's really rather interesting.
Was also reading that depending on your beliefs you could belive in anywhere from 3 to 9 levels of consciousness. Those who believe in 7 see each chakra as corresponding to a different level (can't remember them offhand - bugger).
I'm still not convinced that the 'essence' of a person can be explained by there essential nature i.e. biological/chemical make-up.
Posted by Phillipa on August 23, 2005, at 23:57:14
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
Damos, That's exactly what they told me at Taste and Smell clinic that stem cells can rejuvenate the olfactory cells which control smell. hence restore smell and that controls taste. Thanks Fondly, Phillipa
Posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:34:52
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » alexandra_k, posted by Damos on August 23, 2005, at 23:48:22
> I was just reading that "new cells are only generated in two areas of the brain, the olfactory bulb, that governs the sense of smell, and the hippocamus, an area important to learning." Apparently all the others are as old as we are.
Hmm. Okay then...
So thats to do with the identity of neurons. So (roughly) neurons don't replace. (They sort of do - but it isn't true that we have completely new ones in 7 years). So the same neuron persists through time... And thats the biological level of analysis (the level of analysis where the ontology / things that exist are biological entities such as neurons).I guess we need to drop a little lower... Maybe chemistry, lets see whats there... Different transmitter substances, different chemicals. Now... Are the chemical componants of a single neuron numerically identicle over the lifetime of the neuron? And the answer to that is 'no'. The molecules that make up a single neuron replace over time... Now I'm just pulling numbers from the sky but it might be a reasonable guess to say that every molecule in a single neuron might be different oh, every 7 years ;-)
(I have no idea really...)
And then lets worry about what the molecules are made of. Say you have a molecule of oxygen. Do the atoms that make up that molecule replace over time? What about the sub-atomic particles that make up the atom?
I think... (Though my understanding of sub-atomic particles is very dodgey indeed) that at the level of sub-atomic particles you don't even have a notion of an object moving through space anymore. Rather... Its like your tv or computer screen. Lots of little charges-at-a-place. Its not that a dog runs across your tv screen. Its that a value of charge-at-a-place changes.
> Was also reading that depending on your beliefs you could belive in anywhere from 3 to 9 levels of consciousness. Those who believe in 7 see each chakra as corresponding to a different level (can't remember them offhand - bugger).
:-)
I guess it would depend on how you define / operationalise / measure what constitutes a 'different level of consciousness'.
> I'm still not convinced that the 'essence' of a person can be explained by there essential nature i.e. biological/chemical make-up.... What do you mean by 'essence of a person'?
Posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:37:02
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Damos, posted by Phillipa on August 23, 2005, at 23:57:14
Yeah. Also... Old parts of the brain can take over the function of parts that may have been destroyed. Not all functions though...
Posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
In reply to Re: and what this has to do with the brain... » Phillipa, posted by alexandra_k on August 24, 2005, at 1:37:02
Okay so... Just in case Zeugma or someone hits the boards... I have many confusions around meaning... Philosophy of language is really very hard (IMO).>
hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
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>
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> Two dimensional modal semantics / logic in particular…>The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…
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> The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
>Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.
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> You can do all kinds of funny stuff with indexicals by evaluating their truth / falsity in modal contexts (across other possible worlds):
>
> 'I am here now'.
>
> This statement is necessarily true.
But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character. The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely. But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now, and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words). This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses. I wish, of course, that I (designatum here) could vary at will from world to world, but I can't. I'm stuck here for now. But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
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> It is true that I am here now.
> But it is also possible that I be somewhere else now.Very possible :-)
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
In reply to mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 28, 2005, at 15:01:09
> hi alexandra, you know I can't resist this topic!
lol! indeed. you like the hard stuff (imo)... language and metaphysics. i'm more fond of mental representation...
> The variant developed by David Kaplan which is indeed a modal semantics (he calls it ‘two sorted’, my perception is kinda fuzzy right now so looking at it I can’t tell if it’s two dimensional or not…ah. i remember kaplan (a little) from a couple years back... what gets hard is that people use the same term with a different meaning / reference (aargh! this gets hard to talk about). what i mean is that for some philosophers meaning just is reference. whereas for others there is a distinction between varieties of meaning. it can be hard to figure out how much is verbal dispute with people using terms differently in philosophy of language...
> > The two dimensions aren't 'dennotation and connotation'. My mistake - the two dimensions are extension / reference and intension (standard meaning).
> Denotation and connotation is a variant terminology for extension/intension.:-) so i was right after all! i think i have heard of a distinction between intension and connotation somewhere. where intension was part of standard meaning and connotation was more to do with idiosyncratic variations between speakers. so the intension of 'water' might be 'watery stuff', but the connotation of 'water' might be 'sacred substance' for some individual or smaller group of individuals. but then i've also heard of connotation being used synonomously with intension. so it is hard...
> > 'I am here now'.
> > This statement is necessarily true.> But is it true that I am here now, barely dressed and in front of my computer, is a necessary truth?
> The utterance-type 'I am here now' is one that gets assigned value 'T' every time it's used. The two dimensions of demonstrative logic (which I believe you're talking about) are content and character.hmm. bells are ringing...
i shall have to have a go with kripke, because i am more familiar with his terminology (though i'll try and get the hang of kaplan's usage as i go...)
a rigid designator designates the same individual across all possible worlds...
'alexandra_k' is a rigid designator because it dennotes alexandra_k in all worlds in which it dennotes anything at all.
'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' is a flaccid designator. in this world (the actual world) the description is enough to pick out one and only one individual (alexandra_k). but there is a possible world in which alexandra_k never posted to babble. my officemate might have posted to babble instead and he may have even posted philosophy stuff. in that world the description 'the new zealander who posts about philosophy on psycho-babble' would pick out a different referent. thus it is a contingent truth that that description picks out me. there are other possible worlds in which that same description picks out other individuals.
'i am here now' is a flaccid designator. the 'i' picks out different individuals in different possible worlds.
the 'here' picks out different places in different possible worlds.
the 'now' picks out different times in different possible worlds (because possible worlds are just supposed to be ways this world might be including ways it was / will be in the past / future.the sentance 'i am here now' is necessarily true whenever it is uttered, wherever it is uttered, by whomever it is uttered.
but the person place and time that are referred to change as a function of the context of utterance.
i can know 'i am here now' is necessarily true without knowing who i am, where i am, or when i am.
>The character of 'I am here now' is such that it cannot be used falsely.
so... character is what i might be tempted to call... standard meaning / intension.
>But its content is just everyday contingent truth. I could be somewhere else on a Sunday afternoon (though highly unlikely, of course).
and the content is externalist, which is just to say that the content is the reference / dennotation.
> Both content and character are aspects of sense or intension. Content is the part that ties in with possible worlds, and hence propositions (if you consider that a proposition is either the possible world that makes the utterance true, or the ordered triple of persons, places, and times that make up what I mean when I say 'I am here now.')are you sure that content is part of intension? maybe this is wrong... is content a function that maps character on to contexts in order to deliver a reference?
> Character is the route by which we proceed to the proposition. I use the utterance-type, 'I am here now,' to convey the content that I am here now,
to flaccidly designate who, when, and where you are
>and you do not know what it means until (getting to the reference part of the equation) you know the referents of each of those terms I just used, including the indexicals 'I', 'here', and 'now' (such bewildering little words).
or is it that i do not know what you are referring to until i am able to map the character (standard meaning) onto the context (your environment) thereby getting to the reference?
>This is kind of neat because utterances have two varieties of sense (content and character) and words have extension (reference), and the doctrine that words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence is borne out.
ah. this really is ringing bells...
> So, it is not the referents that vary across possible worlds... it is the senses.???
I thought the character is standard (standard meaning). so the character of 'i' is that it refers (flaccidly) to the speaker.
The content varies depending on circumstances. if I say 'I' the context is such that i refer to alexandra_k.
and the content... just is the reference (because we are being content externalists).and the content is flaccidly designated because we are getting to it via an intension (description) where the reference of the description varies across all possible worlds. whereas if i refer to myself as alexandra_k then that refers to alexandra_k across all possible worlds.
so...
1. 'i am here now'
2. 'alexandra_k is babbling at 10.49 on monday the 25th of august'.
in the actual world both utterances dennote / refer to the same thing.
but when we go modal...
1. is necessarily true (true in all possible worlds) but the dennotation changes as the 'i' pick out different individuals, the 'here' picks out different places, and the 'now' changes.
2. is a contingent truth. while it is not possible that 'i am here now' is false, 'where' i am, who 'i' am, 'when' i am varies...so while it is true that i must be indentical with myself (at one point in time) in order to count as the same thing...
any description of me is only contingently true (in that the description may not obtain to me) across different possible worlds.
except for essential properties which an individual must retain in order to retain its identity as that individual.
kripke reckoned that what was crucial for being the 'same person' was 'descended from that (gesture) sperm and egg combination'. i don't like that. i like to think it is possible that i could have had different biological parents :-( still... i guess he's talking bodily criterion (same human being) rather than psychological criterion.
>But this world has Alexandra in it :-)
:-)
Ah... But you might prefer one or the other of my counter-parts :-)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:03:35
oh.
i might be getting it...
lets have a go...
please correct me if i f*ck it up...two varieties of sense:
character
contentreference
so you take an utterance (lets go with 'I am babbling).
The character is something along the lines of 'the speaker of the utterance is babbling'
The content is determined by the character + the actual world environment. So the character + facts about the actual world determine that...
The referent is 'babbling alexandra_k'
and the referent is designated flacidly because if the context was different the referent would be different.
so...
does that mean that sense is not a ladder that can be disgarded once you have used it to get to the referent????
make sense???
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by alexandra_k on August 28, 2005, at 18:08:00
am in something of an addled way right now, wrote a detailed commentary and then my connection failed- i'm an idiot for not working offline- but anyways- it's late here- 11:19 pm Monday night and have an early day coming up- so- detailed exegesis will wait, a few comments i can't refrain from and are salient enough to me (hopefully to you)-
'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character. Character is a function that maps contexts onto contents. Content is a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions. (So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))Now I remain [Z] (zero-place predicate denoting 'exists in that world') regardless of the flaccid designators that denote me and that vary from world to world (say the one in which I am female, the one in which I am not a basket case, the one in which my previous post to you wasn't lost (aggg!); I am me, just as Richard Nixon would still be Nixon even if not named 'Nixon' in many of the possible worlds in which the zero-place predicate [Nixon] has an extension denoting a member of those worlds.
Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant. By content Kaplan means more or less what everyone means when they talk about 'propositions' (it always comes down to those, right? Well, all that matters is that we are good content-externalists!)Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant. 'I' is not constant. But I can only use it to point to [Z], your friend from the tail end of the alphabet, no matter what world I am in or what flaccid designators pick me out.
Addendum largely unrelated: Counterpart theory is strangely satisfying. When I am at my lowest, I can always think of how my counterparts are having a great time, and rather than making me jealous of them, I feel oddly consoled. It's like, they're part of the team, and even though I'm slacking off, they're getting the job done. Strange, huh?
Posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
this is one of those terms that i obsess over late at night. I am terrible at grammar but am obsessed with it. Presumably a zero-place predicate is one that has no hole to fill. If [Z] exists in a world, then the function that [Z] represents is available for entry into statements made about [Z]. [Z] is just there. Intransitivive verb: one-place predicate: x breathes. Transitive verb: x loves y. The letters represent holes that must be filled before a statement can be made, or a sentence uttered. I suppose that 'zero-place predicates' (of which 'exists' is the only one of which I can think offhand) are a way of saying what Kant said: 'existence is not a predicate.' (I'm quoting secondhand.) Existence just means you can put it on the left-hand side of a copula (itself a term that does not really mean) so you can make a meaningful statement when a real predicate is appended.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 5:56:40
In reply to zero-place predicates, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 23:00:46
Can't think right now.
Want to think on what you have said a bit more.
just wanted to say that that last bit reminds me of Quine:
'to be is to be the value of a vairable'.
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » alexandra_k, posted by zeugma on August 29, 2005, at 22:40:14
Okay... Now I am confused again...
Time for a little definitional agreement...CHARACTER - a function that maps contexts onto contents.
CONTENT - a function that maps possible worlds onto extensions.
REFERENCE - the external object that is picked out.
Lets have a go with 'alexandra_k':
CHARACTER - I was the individual that was present at the association between word and referent (context -> content).
CONTENT - When considering the worlds where the term 'alexandra_k' is correctly applied we are considering the worlds in which there is an individual with my essential properties (possible world -> extension).
REFERENCE - alexandra_k (extension).Lets have a go with 'the kiwi babbler who goes on about philosophy'.
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance alexandra_k is the only individual who meets that description (context -> content)
CONTENT - It is possible that I never came to babble and that other kiwi philosophers did (etc etc) so the individual picked out across different possible worlds varies...(possible worlds -> extension)
REFERENCE - varies across other possible worlds.Lets have a go at 'I'
CHARACTER - In the context of utterance 'I' picks out alexandra_k (context -> content)
CONTENT - given the character... across all possible worlds 'I' picks out alexandra_k. (possible worlds -> extensions)
REFERENCE - alexandra_k
> 'I', 'here', 'now' are not flaccid designators. They are rigid. Rigidity applies to content, not character.I do believe I'm getting you now :-)
>(So content is intensional. And we are externalists about content. :-))
Hmm. I never thought of it like that. Intensional externalism... I like the sound of that :-)
> Now 'now', here' and so on are also rigid. But of course only with respect to their content; their characters (which are also part of the senses of these terms) are not constant.
Yeah, I get you.
> Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)
Posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 18:03:37
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
all this angst over the relation between word and world...
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 30, 2005, at 17:46:54
Characters are neither rigid nor flaccid; they are constant or inconstant.
Okay...
No, sorry... How do they get to be inconstant?
(Does that happen when the context of utterance changes???)>>Most characters are constant. For example, 'the car' refers to the (contextually salient) automobile I don't drive any more (thankfully), at least it does in my dialect of English. Questions of contextual salience are presumably pragmatic, because obviously many definite descriptions have an uncertain reference strictly speaking, but are nonetheless used widely with few problems.
Context, insofar as it affects character, is the ordered set of elements (time, place, speaker, world) that determines the content of the utterance. So I say 'I woke up two hours ago.' The function that is the character of 'I' includes as part of its determining elements 'speaker', and that speaker (and hence contentual element) is 'zeugma.' The time is 8 am Wednesday, and so 'two hours ago' designates the contentual element '6 am.'
But if you had uttered the identical string of words, I would have to know that the character of 'I', while identical to the character that 'I' means when I use it, yields the content 'alexandra_k', and likewise with the other elements of the utterance. So the equation character=standard meaning is basically right.I shouldn't have said, then, that characters are 'constant' or 'inconstant.' If these words didn't have a constant meaning, we would be speaking different dialects, and getting confused in the process. I think what I 'meant' was that for most non-indexical terms, they yield the same SORT of content as definite descriptions, and hence the pathway from character to content, and then to extension, can be collapsed into a single process that can be designated as 'intension.' So empty singular terms like 'the present King of France' can be regarded as having an intension though yielding an extension that is the empty set. In fact that was what intensions were mostly useful for, apart from problems that arise where one object can be designated by more than one singular term (e.g. 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star').
and yeah, indexical terms are fixed relative to their contents (I am the only one to use 'I' to designate [Z], though others may share my name and many of my attributes) in virtue of their contextual elements- I am naturally going to figure in every ordered quadruple that represents the context of each of my utterances, and one must use this context to arrive at me. So the character as function (meaning) is constant (i.e. ordered quadruple) but the elements of the set are context-dependent, and without a grasp of the context, the right output can't be gotten. That is what differentiates the indexicals from the everyday terms like 'car' and 'computer'- the time, place and speaker aren't important as long as the language is shared between interlocutors. So those factors can generally be ignored when dealing with such terms.
Apologies for highly prolix reply.
I'm glad you like intensional externalism. :-)
-z
Posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:38:11
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
sorry, when I said 'contentual element' when speaking of contexts, i should have said 'contextual elements.' Content cannot figure as input to character, only as output.
-z
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.., posted by zeugma on August 31, 2005, at 7:33:22
:-)
Philosophy of language is hard...
(imo)Are you interested in teleological semantics at all???? Frogs and bacteria and cats on a dark night and cat v dog and stuff like that?????
Millikan is a hard read...
But I've done a bit of reading on proper functions...
Posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 18:00:25
In reply to Re: mystery of the missing indexical.. » zeugma, posted by alexandra_k on August 31, 2005, at 17:11:40
Utterances and thoughts are distinctive in that they (can be) ABOUT states of affairs / events / facts / situations in the external world (the world outside the head / mind / brain).
They can represent accurately or inaccurately. They can be true (if accurate) and false (if inaccurate).
If we go a long way back into the evolutionary history of this world then we can go back to before life emerged... At that point in time there isn't any intentionality / aboutness / representation.
These phenomena emerged via the process of natural selection and thus there must be a naturalistic account of the emergence of the phenomena.
There might be lessons for the present...
Lets have a look at some rudimentary aboutness...
Frogs snap their tongues at moving dark spots.
A mental representation is what occurs between the stimulus and the response.
Presumably the stimulus gets represented in the frogs brain and that representation produces the tongue snapping response.In order for something to count as a representation misrepresentation must be possible...
Now, if an experimentor throws a bee bee pellet in front of the frog the frog will snap its tongue at it.
So the million dollar question is 'is this a case of mis-representation?'
There are a number of candidates for the content of the frogs representation:
1) fly
2) moving dark spot
3) fly or bee beeIf the content of the frogs representation is FLY then snapping at a bee bee pellet is a case of misrepresentation.
If the content of the frogs representation is MOVING DARK SPOT then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because a bee bee pellet just is a moving dark spot
If the content of the frogs representation is FLY OR BEE BEE then snapping at a bee bee pellet is not a case of misrepresentation (because it is correctly applied to anything that is either a fly or a bee bee. In case you are worried about disjunctive concepts there isn't really a problem here. People talk of 'greenstone' and it just turns out that greenstone is appropriately applied to either jadite or nephrite).So... How does actual selection history help fix the content of the frogs representation?
In the actual selection history of the frog bee bees in the environment would have been rare (or non-existant). Thus if the frog has the concept FLY OR BEE BEE then this will confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
In the actual selection history of the frog if enough of the moving dark spots were flies or other nutritious (or digestible or whatever) substances then MOVING DARK SPOT would confer the same selectional advantage as possession of the concept FLY.
So... About now the thought is that we need to go modal to fix the content of the frogs representation.
There is a possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLY OR BEE BEE.
Some of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by BEE BEE.
All of them are going to die out (inadequate nutrition).
There is another possible world in which both flies and bee bees are regularly present for frogs. Lets say that in this world the tongue snap response is triggered by FLIES.
More of them will survive.
In virtue of this... Some people have argued that the content of the representation is best captured by 'fly'. Though there has been some haggling over 'nutritious substance' and alternatives like that as well...
But what I don't understand...
Is that...
Possible worlds are irrelevant with respect to ACTUAL selection pressures...
And ACTUAL selection pressures must be what determine the content of ACTUAL representations.
If we wanted to delineate the content of frogs representations in other possible worlds then we would need to look at their selection pressures.
The trouble is that 'other ways this world might have gone' don't help us with respect to ways this world is...And so... I would say that the content of the representation is still indeterminate.
Actual selection history is insufficient to fix content.
And going modal... Only helps with respect to fixing the content of frogs representations on other possible worlds.
It doesn't help us fix the content of the actual world frogs representations.
And going modal... Is insufficient to fix the content of the frogs representations on other possible worlds because... Selection history (which is what is supposed to be relevant to fix content) underdetermines representational content.But once again I'm probably missing something...
But there is also the point...
There is also the point that...
Natural selection isn't so much about 'survival of the fittest' as it is about 'elimination of the least successful'. As such... Why should we expect selected mechanisms (or selected representational contents for that matter) to be optimal? They just need to be 'good enough' to get buy...Natural selection is a kludge. A hack. (Dennett)
Short sighted.
Not with a view to other possible worlds ;-)
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