Posted by Estella on May 21, 2006, at 2:17:39
In reply to Re: three factors of emotion pulled apart » llrrrpp, posted by Estella on May 21, 2006, at 1:54:53
the identity theory (of pain) goes like this:
'pain' is 'brain state x' (where x is to be determined by science)
by analogy:
'water' is H2O (or whatever science tells us it is)
in the actual world (ie in this world) we pick out water by its superficial properties. it is the watery stuff that fills the lakes and oceans falls from the skies the drinkable potable stuff. but then science comes along and discovers that the nature of the watery stuff that fills the lakes and oceans falls from the skies the drinkable potable stuff is H2O.
then the thought is that if we consider various counterfactuals... water tracks H2O instead of tracking watery stuff.
so there is a possible world where the drinkable potable watery stuff is of chemical structure XYZ and the appropriate thing to say about that world is that watery stuff is not water (because it picks out a different kind of thing).
and conversely there is a possible world where the H2O is black and tarry and the appropriate thing to say about that world is that water is black and tarry.
(there are complications)...
but consider the case of pain...
'pain' is 'brain state x' (where x is to be determined by science)
in the actual world we pick out pain by the phenomenology and the scientists discover that the phenomenology maps on to brain state x.
now there is much disagreement about how to analyse the counter factuals.
consider a possible world where brain state x is accompanied by a pleasurable sensation.
do we say that the pleasurable sensation is pain on that world?
or do we say that that sensation isn't pain?
some people say that 'pain' tracks the phenomenology. pains are essentailly painful. they feel unpleasant by definition.
other people say that 'pain' is a natural kind term just like 'water' and 'lion' and 'gold' etc. 'pain' tracks whatever science says it is.
it is unclear whether emotions are more like water or more like pains.
there is another route you can take...
according to functionalism some terms don't track essential properties rather they track functional roles.
e.g.
belief.
beliefs are thought to be states that:
tend to be caused by the world
(belief that p tends to be caused by p)
play a certain role in their interaction with other beliefs (inductive and deductive reasoning)
play a certain role in their interaction with other mental states (desires typically so as to produce the relevant action)so beliefs are thought to be whatever states play that functional role.
e.g., pains
pains are thought to be states such that:
they are elicited by certain kinds of stimulus (in the world - bodily damage or something like that)
they interact with other mental states in various ways (capturing attention etc)
they tend to cause certain behaviours (withdrawal from noxious stimulus, clutching etc)(on the identity theory pains track either phenomenology or body / brain states (depending on whether the identity is phenomenological or physical). functionalists track functional roles so whatever plays the relevant functional role is pain, and in the case of 'mad pain' - which is the phenomenology of pain accompanied by approach behaviours for example... that wouldnl't count as pain)
maybe emotions should be defined by:
phenomenology (like some people think pains should be)
bodily / brain state (like neuroscience seems to think it should be)
functional role (like some cognitive psychologists / AI researchers / philosophers think other mental states should be)hard to know...
but i don't think anyone has really looked at identity conditions for emotion across possible worlds...
:-)
poster:Estella
thread:645293
URL: http://www.dr-bob.org/babble/social/20060513/msgs/646453.html