![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 11 to 35 of 52. Go back in thread:
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 20:17:58
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on August 30, 2006, at 18:32:18
Sorry - I should have said thanks very much for passing on the links. I wasn't quibbling about the links so much as I was relating my concerns with neuro-imaging in general.
The person who I heard talk was fairly sceptical of neuro-imaging in general, but then she is a cognitive psychologist.
Posted by finelinebob on August 31, 2006, at 20:59:55
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 19:04:30
> > Is there any other kind?
>
> Well... There is subjective reality, inter-subjective reality, objective reality.But from a sociocultural viewpoint, any notion of "subjective" is replaced early by intersubjectve. "Meaning" becomes internalized as we are introduced into a subculture, yet the thought "sign" the meaning is hooked to remains intact or even enriched. For example, I have an "inner speech" sign of what work is, and that "inner speech" is nothing really like how I would describe it in outer thought. Expressing what "work" means, however, depends on a cultural context -- am I at my job, doing gardening, or studying mechanics in physics? Vygotsky, unlike Whorf, accepts the existence of an "objective" reality but that reality can only be given meaning within a culture and its modes of expression. Again, the notion of "mind" is not so much "groupthink" as is it a development of an intersubjective meaning-space that helps define that subculture from other subcultures. The book "Thought and Language", in fact, is often referred to as an unfortunate misinterpretation -- a more accurate one being "Thinking and Speech". So, Vygotsky can be seen as similar to Whorf as being subscribing to a liguistic relativity, but there are key differences in the base assumptions as well as the "units of measurements": lignuistic phrases for Whorf, and units of meaning for Vygotsky.
Toss into that Bakhtin and his students' developments of the functions of language, and things can get rather interesting. Too put things simply, a speaker makes speech act bound within a sociocultural context and the listener receives that -- pure simple social transmission, and not very satisfying. But introduce two functions of speech: the "univocal" and "multivocal" functions. Univocal is kinda "my way or the highway". Multivocal accounts for the listeners possibly having different understandings. And this applies not just to the speaker, because a speech act always involves both the speaker and the listener. A listener can understand a speech act as either function as well. It becomes interesting to consider when purposes are crossed between the two actors. Also interesting is the possibility that even in the case of both actors accepting a univocal relationship, that the listener misconstrues what is meant by the speaker. In a way, it's a linguistic mutation, which allows for movement beyond a purely social transmission argument. In fact, meaning can pe problematized by the intentional "mutation" of the speaker's meaning by that of the listener.
> Hard to study objective reality though...Thus the quote: "The world may not be as real as we think it is."
Scientists work on models. Models aren't the real think, but scientific progress means modfication of a model or its replacement by a model with greater explanatory power. All the same, what scientists use to explain reality may actually look nothing at all like "real reality". That is the basis of one of the fundamental postulates of science: any (or all) theory underdetermines reality.
The top and bottom quarks aren't also referred to as "truth" and "beauty" purely as a jest. Science goes beyond Occam's razor to look not just for simplicity for "truth", but it also looks to beauty. Theories that are simple and beautiful present the verisimilitude of Truth. Even for those who stubbornly cling to objectivism, metaphysics and mysticism still play a role in modern science. Thus the confluence of epistomology (knowing) and ontology (being). Pragmatism is not enough of a justification for melding these two schools into one.
> > My own understanding comes from the psychologist Lev Vygotsky ("Mind in Society" and "Thought and Language") and the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin (sorry, haven't read any original work, but this is a good one "Dialogism").
>
> Hrm. I haven't heard of either of those.If you're not a developmental, educational or cultural psychologist, or for Bakhtin marxist literary theory or semiotics, then that's likely the case.
> A guess... It is a model of communication.Again, more than that. It's a theoretical basis for the differential development of meaning based in one's culture in order to communicate (the shared mind) while retaining an independence of thought from speech.
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 22:43:29
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on August 31, 2006, at 20:59:55
Thats all kinda interesting :-)
Are you familiar with Quine at all? He writes about 'radical translation' so that if an anthropoligist were to encounter a tribe what she would want to do would be to construct a translation manuel which would provide a way of translating from the natives tongue into english (or whatever).
He writes about how the anthropoligist should go about constructing the translation manuel. You need to try and figure a sign of assent and a sign of dissent. He talks about that a little. Then once you have that established you can try and figure out words for things.
He says that suppose a rabbit runs across the field and the native yells 'Gavagi' and points at it. You now have a number of candidate hypotheses as to what 'Gavagi' means. It could mean 'rabbit' or it could mean 'fetch me my spear!' or it could mean 'Jakes pet'. You need to try and establish which candidate translation is right by engaging in some hypothesis testing. If you know another native has a rabbit in a cage you could take the native to the cage and point at the rabbit and say 'Gavagi' to see whether you get assent or dissent. You are always supposed to radically translate with the assumption that the natives statements are true (principle of charity).
Quine argues that meaning is always underdetermined by stimulus meaning. Gavagi could mean 'rabbit' or it could mean 'undetached rabbit part' or it could mean 'rabbit until time t and duck afterwards' or it could mean 'rabbit on Tuesdays' or whatever. No matter how much empirical investigation we do the stimulus meaning always underdetermines the translation manuel.
Of course we don't typically encounter such radical scepticism... But Quines argument for the indeterminacy of translation (and the indeterminacy of reference) has implications for us understanding one another from WITHIN a language as well. How do I know that I use the word 'rabbit' to mean the same as you when you say 'rabbit'. Even if we agree in all our judgements of what does and does not count as a rabbit that still underdetermines what we mean by rabbit.
So in a way Quines argument kinda makes it surprising that language and communication is possible at all.
I guess you have that on the one hand (undermining the social aspect of language) while on the other you have Wittgenstein (undermining the private aspect of language). This is controversial but I'll try and reconstruct.
In order to use a word there must be something that counts as using the word correctly and something that counts as using the word incorrectly.
The correct / incorrect amounts to the word having a criteria of application.
If I invent a word just for me to label some inner sensation (and there is no translation into a public language) then there is no criteria of correct and incorrect application.
If I say 'there is that sensation again' and apply the word there is no distinction between seeming to apply the word correctly and actually applying the word correctly.
Hence meanings can't be a private individual matter because you need a linguistic community (of two people at least) in order for there to be a criteria of seems right / is right. Hence private languages (which can't be translated into public languages) are impossible.
But then Quine puts pressure on how much you can translate between languages... And how much you can translate between different speakers of the same language.
Then you have Davidson 'on the very possibility of a conceptual scheme' (or similar) saying that languages CAN be translated into other languages and if something can't be translated into another language then it is not a language.
Old stuff... I don't remember it very well. Probably haven't done a very good job of explaining. I need to learn more about the sociology.
I'm interested in the relationship between the following levels:
-Socio-cultural
-Psychological (Intentional stance / personal level / level of folk psychology)
-Cognitive psychology
-Neurobiology / neuroscienceSeems that the facts on the lower levels determine / fix the facts on the higher levels. Most people accept this (and neurobiology facts are fixed by chemical facts are fixed by the facts of physics). But there is controversy over whether different levels are explanatorily autonomous or whether you should always seek a reductive explanation. Is there a fundamental level (or does that depend on the question)? What is the relationship between explanations at each level etc.
Socio-cultural level is the one I"m the least familiar with...
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 23:06:17
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 22:43:29
AND...
Should different mental illnesses be explained from different levels or should neurobiology always be the aim?
Does it depend on the question?
I mean... If we ask 'why do white western women have higher incidence of anorexia than women from pakistan' it seems that the socio-cultural level is fundamental (which is just to say most appropriate). If we ask 'why does this particular white western woman have anorexia compared to that white western woman' then the fundamental level of explanation would seem to be... either psychological or cognitive or neuro-biological (I don't want to commit myself to which but my point is that the socio-cultural level wouldn't be fundamental for that question).
Should we aim for explanatory pluralism?
What is the relationship between the different levels?
Do we want multi-level models for all of the disorders?
Are some levels more relevant to some disorders?The modelling stuff is interesting too...
There is a huge literature on models and the relationship that models bear to the world / to the real world phenomena.
Stuff on whether models are abstract objects (mathematical ones) or fictional entities (strings of propositions / descriptions).
Do we compare models directly to the world?
Do we explain phenomena by appealing to the model? If we do this latter thing then what is the relationship between the world and the model?
Are there objective facts about the 'best' model of the phenomena or is the best model relative to our interests etc?Some people think that what psychiatry needs to do is come up with a model of functioning (with reference to cognitive neuropsychology) and then explain various symptoms of the various disorders by appealing to breakdowns in the model. You will be able to read off places to interveane by viewing the model. But that means that models are going to be very abstract entities (or fictions) indeed. What is the relationship between me (as an instance of a disorder) and the model that describes the disorder?
At what level of generality should models be pitched?
Will they be useful (if there is too much individual variation then intervention points on the model might not map too well onto intervention points within the individual)
Lots of questions... No clear answers... Time to do some work ;-)
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 0:41:33
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 20:17:58
> Sorry - I should have said thanks very much for passing on the links. I wasn't quibbling about the links so much as I was relating my concerns with neuro-imaging in general.
>
> The person who I heard talk was fairly sceptical of neuro-imaging in general, but then she is a cognitive psychologist.
>Its fine to have a healthy skepticism of things -- I just happen to differ and I know that these imaging projects and the era, about 10-12 years ago that they were in was a groundbreaking discovery for the population suffering from OCD, which is a lifetime brain disorder, though one can manage it quite well (usually) with behaviour therapy. Tourette's is related as well though its harder to manage as is pure obsessions (garbage thought). I know this personally (OCD that is.)
You can study more about it if you wish at the OC Foundation
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 1:02:08
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 0:41:33
Sorry, what was the groundbreaking discovery?
That if you take a bunch of people with OCD and do brain imaging... Then you figure the averages across the population... Then you decide on your colour scheme... And you do the same with people... Without OCD? With another dx? Then your pretty pics look different?
Er... How does that help?
I just don't understand what the brain imaging shows. Also... If you take a person with OCD chances are their brain is within normal range. It is just averages across populations that have been deemed to be different (and are there systematic differences between averages across different populations?)
Posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 1:18:48
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 23:06:17
> Should different mental illnesses be explained from different levels or should neurobiology always be the aim?
>
> Does it depend on the question?Yes, no and no.
If all there was to neurological disorders was faulty wiring/chemistry, we'd still have all the coping mechanisms and behaviors of significant co-actors in our lives and the sociocultural context in which the disorder is interpreted.
I guess I see it this way (figuratively and literally). If you wear glasses, switch to contacts, then put your glasses on with your contacts in, you realize that eyeglasses do more than magnify. Particularly if you have any level of astigmatism, they compensate. So, back to neurology -- say we perfect the science of psychopharmacology and the neurochemistry of brain function and can completely compensate for one's "biological deficits", you still have a lot of psychological work to do; intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural.
> Should we aim for explanatory pluralism?
> What is the relationship between the different levels?
> Do we want multi-level models for all of the disorders?
> Are some levels more relevant to some disorders?Since any one theory will underdetermine reality, then you can get a better model if you can find compatible theories that address different topics.
Take the favorite whipping post of science these days: evolution. Most objections I've heard against evolution violate boundary conditions. Evolution says nothing about how life began. It certainly says nothing about the formation of the earth or our solar system. It says nothing about the big band, nor does it have any escalation at the other end -- inclusive of how will life end and will the universe end as well. If you want a broader scientific explanation of the "Big Picture", you need to include other theories -- and still accept undetermintion.
Models seek their own level of explanatory power. Or, rather, we must limit our use of models to their constraints and boundaries.
Have heard of Quine, particularly in a "history of qualitative science" course. Particularly ontological relativity. Nice set up for more post-post-modern takes on Heidegger and for applying Hermeneutics to social science analytic methods.
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 2:12:36
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 1:18:48
We might have a different world view.
I'll put consciousness to the side because that is more controversial and I don't know what I believe. Aside from that, you have different levels of explanation like this (of course I'm simplifying and leaving out a lot).
- Social
- Psychological (beliefs, desires, emotions, hopes etc)
- Biological
- Chemical
- PhysicalYou can think of these as different levels. There are different entities at each level and there are different facts (about the states of those entities) at each level. At the level of physics there are facts about what subatomic particles there are and the way in which those subatomic particles behave. Now the thought is that if we were idealised reasoners and we knew all the facts about subatomic particles and how they behave then we would be able to logically deduce what entities there is at the chemical level of explanation and how those entities behave. And if we (as ideal reasoners) were to know all the facts about the entities and behaviour of the entities at the level of chemistry then we would be able to deduce the entities and behaviour of the entities at the level of biology and so forth up the hierarchy.
Another way of saying this is that God (so to speak) didn't have to fix the physical facts on day one then the chemical facts on day two then the biological facts on day three. He just had to fix the facts at the physical level and then all the other facts thereby got fixed for free.
So...
If that is right. As a claim about the way the world is then we might be inclined to think that explanation should bottom out at the physical level as if we knew everything there was to know at the level of physics we would thereby know everything there is to know at higher levels of explanation.
You might think that the trouble is that we are not ideal reasoners and we aren't even close to knowing all the physical facts (and we probably won't get there anytime soon). As such because we have such tiny finite imperfect minds we are best to be explanatory pluralists (offering explanations at all the levels) because we are simply too stupid to make progress at the lower levels of explanation.
Or...
One might think that the levels of explanation are autonomous in the sense that you lose information when you drop from a high level to a lower level of explanation.
One way of seeing this is to note that while you can deduce chemistry from physics and while you can deduce biology from chemistry the deduction doesn't work the other way around. It is possible for there to be a world that is a duplicate of our world at the psychological level but to have a radically different chemistry. It is possible for there to be a world that is a duplicate of our world at the chemical level but to have a radically different physics. You can't make logical deductions from high levels to low levels but you can make predictions at higher levels that collapse / don't make sense at lower levels.
For example... If I tell you that I'm going to order 500 shares in general motors (psychological level) then you can predict something about my behaviour (that I'm going to order 500 shares in general motors) that can't be predicted from any other level of explanation. There are many (physically) different ways of ordering 500 shares in general motors. I could pick up the phone with my left hand or with my right hand or I could get my secretary to phone for me. I could send a fax or an email or whatever. Those are very different behaviours that are only the same kind of behaviour on one level of explanation. You can't capture the notion on a lower level. To drop to the level of physics... Loses informational content.
But...
It does seem strange that:
- The lower level facts fix the higher level facts
and
- Sometimes the higher level facts give more information than the lower level facts (as a matter of principle and this would be the case for idealised reasoners with perfect information)Or...
Am I completely nuts?
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 1:02:08
> Sorry, what was the groundbreaking discovery?
>
> That if you take a bunch of people with OCD and do brain imaging... Then you figure the averages across the population... Then you decide on your colour scheme... And you do the same with people... Without OCD? With another dx? Then your pretty pics look different?
>
> Er... How does that help?
Well true insults aside to peer reviewed journalism and key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD by groundbreaking research when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorder, it illustrated for the first time that OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings. That if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
> I just don't understand what the brain imaging shows. Also... If you take a person with OCD chances are their brain is within normal range. It is just averages across populations that have been deemed to be different (and are there systematic differences between averages across different populations?)
2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime. That's a significant percentage. That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing. I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same. People with OCD do not have the same particular brain structure, nor do people with Schizophrenia, nor other key illnesses, all due to increasing abilitiy to image the brain in more precise fashion. I'm not going to argue deities over science, its an endless discussion.
I agree with the idea that the patient is not just a number or a statistic, but biological reductionist models help us understand complex systems in intricate ways never thought before. If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover, along with stem cell lines and other issues that this country is pathetically behind in the 21st century at the moment compared to other western societies. But I digress -- we have free will, and I feel you have the free will to believe what you may wish-- Jay
Posted by SLS on September 1, 2006, at 7:20:19
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
Although I cannot add anything to the discussion regarding the paradigms being offered, I just wanted to report that my brain was imaged using a FDG P.E.T. scan at the NIH under various conditions, including some standard task performances. At the time, I was in a severely vegetative depressive state as a presentation of bipolar disorder. Compared to controls, my entire cerebral cortex was underactive as was portrayed by the colors blue and green. I did not suffer from depressed mood, melancholia, suicidal ideation, grieving, or any other type of negative thinking that I can conceive of. In fact, my mind was so inactive, I didn't think about much of anything. I spent much of my time staring at walls. My variety of depression comprises anergia, loss of interest, amotivation, low libido, hypersomnia, anhedonia, cognitive imparairments, slowed thinking, memory imparairments, psychomotor retardation, and other vegetative symptoms. At this point, my condition is not driven by psychosocial factors.
- Scott
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
> Well true insults aside...
I'm not intending to insult anybody.
> key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD...
That is precisely the question I'm asking: How has neuroimaging 'helped save the lives' of anyone with OCD? How is finding neurological differences (across averages of populations) of any relevance to anything?
> when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorder
*Just* a "neurotic" disorder? What do you take to be the "neurotic" vs "legitimate" disorders (I expect that is the distinction you are trying to make)? Do you really mean to imply that somehow disorders with pretty neuroimaging (across populations) are somehow *legit* whereas disorders without pretty neuroimagine (across populations) are somehow *neurotic* / non legit?
> OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings.
Across averages of populations. Can you hear the difference? I don't know how you define *normal* compared to *averages across populations* but my bet is that even when you find differences in the averages across populations that doesn't entail anything at all for the neurological detail within the individual. If you really think that neurological differences are the marker for different mental illnesses then you will find that... Making this up... Say, half of the individuals with OCD have no significant differences neurologically than people without OCD. There aren't neurological markers. It is as simple as that. You could of course maintain that there *are* differences it is just that we haven't found them as yet. That is to make a significant empirical bet on something that we currently have no evidence for, however. If you scanned peoples brains with schizophrenia and OCD fact is that most of them... Would fall in line with controls. There are a few individuals who deviate radically enough to throw the whole populations average off course (which is why it is done on the level of populations and not individuals). Most people with mental illness have... Surprisingly (perhaps) normal brains. So much the worse for... Notions of mental illness. Lol.
> if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol. The actual difference between levels of activation varies depending on how you define *statistically significant difference*. How do phobics brains *light up* when they are presented with a picture of the object they are phobic of? How does that compare to OCD controls?
> 2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime.So their brains differ from normal and then... Spontaneously switch back again?
> That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing.
How has brain imaging helped with that? OCD is defined by behavioural criteria not by neuroimaging criteria and neuroimaging is a hopeless predictor of behaviour.
> I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same.
But people are different. Both normal people and different people with the same dx. If you are hoping for similarities across different people with the same dx... You tend to find there is considerable variation across *normal* brains so fairly unsurprisingly you find the same considerable variation across OCD brains or the brains of populations with any dx you care to think of...
> I agree with the idea that the patient is not just a number or a statistic,
Or an average...
> but biological reductionist models help us understand complex systems in intricate ways never thought before.
Do they? That is precisely what I am calling into question. The point at issue is:
How much do biological reductionist models actually help us understand
1) mental illness across population types
2) my particular variety of difficulty?> If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
We aren't talking about cancer we are talking about mental illness. You might have something approaching a litmus test for cancer but there is nothing comperable to that with respect to mental illness. If you neuroimage someones brain you can't use that for dx. So... How much does neuroimaging help accurate dx of mental illness???
> And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover...
Well that is the question really. I say... Not a lot.
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 14:44:55
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
> > Well true insults aside...
>
> I'm not intending to insult anybody.Well if you knew the individuals you would be, but that's beside the point.
>
> > key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD...>
> > when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorderBefore the book "The Boy Who Couldn't Stop Washing" came out in the late 80s.
> > OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings.
Most people with mental illness have... Surprisingly (perhaps) normal brains. So much the worse for... Notions of mental illness. Lol.We're not arguing whether people are "normal" or have "normal" brains, normal is an artificial concept -- we're talking about brains that are different to your "average" control that you are going on about.
> > if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
>
> The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.This is not funny to sufferers of OCD. Please be civil about it.
>
> > 2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime.
>
> So their brains differ from normal and then... Spontaneously switch back again?No. It seems to me you have not ever studied OCD. 2% will have it for their ENTIRE lifetime. And yes, there are outside triggers that influence the biological switch that turns on. Most frequently puberty but can be other traumatic eras. Then things may recede and come back in another format, triggered by other events.
> > That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing.
>
> How has brain imaging helped with that? OCD is defined by behavioural criteria not byOCD is a behavioural form if you are referring that we have free will, OCD sufferers for the most part except a small percent which fall in the psychotic spectrum know what they are doing. Nonetheless their brains will light up like a candle in the caudate nucleus.
> > I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same.
>
> But people are different. Both normal people and different people with the same dx. If you are hoping for similarities across different people with the same dx...Of course people are different, slightly, in their brains and genes. I could even make a profound statement that would be considered racist that there are genetic variations and things that can be imaged across race. But in the same light, OCD is experienced regardless of ethnicity or location. Its just a question of quality of medicine and studies.
> How much do biological reductionist models actually help us understand
> 1) mental illness across population typesSee above
> 2) my particular variety of difficulty?
I don't know what you suffer from.
>
> > If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
>
> We aren't talking about cancer we are talking about mental illness. You might have something approaching a litmus test for cancer but there is nothing comperable to that with respect to mental illness. If you neuroimage someones brain you can't use that for dx. So... How much does neuroimaging help accurate dx of mental illness???Without getting profoundly annoyed and uncivil, I have never said they diagnose illnesses -- YET. They are RESEARCH tools that help us in better diagnostics of future methods of treatment.
>
> > And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover...
>
> Well that is the question really. I say... Not a lot.I beg to differ. I am also ending this argument because I cannot argue that the world is round or flat without saying some rather uncivil statements. I do believe this is a partial ruse thread, however as I said I am civil and you have free will as a human being hopefully in a democratic area to believe as you wish.
Tidings-- Jay
Posted by SLS on September 1, 2006, at 16:43:00
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
> The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
> Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.
I would not laugh at your image if your cortex were portrayed as blue. It would be damning.
- Scott
Posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 19:41:35
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 2:12:36
> We might have a different world view...
>
> - Social
> - Psychological (beliefs, desires, emotions, hopes etc)
> - Biological
> - Chemical
> - PhysicalWell, I'd say that there is little difference between cultural, social and psychological other than a factor of scale or localization;but those sitting on top of the other three from a non-dualist point of view makes perfect sense.
We do differ on a few key points. If what you mean by "fact" is an indisputable truth, I'd say you can have those in logics and semantics but not in science. No scientific "truth" is indisputable, and no indisputable truth is scientific. If you take an empiricist's definition of a "fact" conforming to a statement verified by objective observation, again I would have to say you can have no truths because science is based on falsifiability and not verification, and objectivity is a fiction since all observation is theory-laden -- you cannot approach a scientific experiment without it being couched in an explanatory framework.A closely related second point is that rationality is also a fiction based on the epistemology of empiricism. But both fictions (rationality and fact) are **useful** fictions as long as you remain within the boundary conditions of science. Again, that is the essence of a model -- it is a useful fiction.
But, to continue the thought experiment and acknowledging that some "Primary Mover" started physics off on its merry way some 13.5 billion years ago...
> So...
>
> If that is right. As a claim about the way the world is then we might be inclined to think that explanation should bottom out at the physical level as if we knew everything there was to know at the level of physics we would thereby know everything there is to know at higher levels of explanation.
And assuming perfect replication and rigid determinism of a higher level by its predecessor, then yes, a theory of everything would be able to explain everything at all levels. "42" would make sense.
> Or...
>
> One might think that the levels of explanation are autonomous in the sense that you lose information when you drop from a high level to a lower level of explanation.
Which is not at all inconsistent with the bottom-up approach as long as you do not assume rigid determinism and perfect replication.Even at the level of subatomic physics, tho, we do not have these conditions. "Reality" is probablistic, not deterministic. We see things such as quantum tunneling, paired electron spin experiments that can only (now) be explained as information travelling at speeds indistinguishable from instantaneous. We have "virtual pairs" of particles and their anti-particles popping in and out of existence all the time, one consequence being the "evaporation" of black holes -- matter escaping the inescapable. As quoted before, "The world may not be as real as we think it is."
I don't know the chemical equivalents, but obviously in biology we have random mutations based on probabiltiy and by interactions with external agents (carcinogens, energetic photons).
Take it up to the cultural-social-psychological, and not only do we have misunderstandings, we have intentional differences of opinion. There is no pure social transmission of meaning if the transmitter or receiver "malfunction" or if they intend to be subversive.
We have chaos, not unfettered replication, at every level and in-between.
To make the story even more interesting, we have acheived a state where we can now turn the tables, starting with civil disorder back into antiquity. Out of such disorder came the freedom of intellect. Out of the development of such intellect, we can now alter genomes, "create" molecules that do not exist in nature, and we can even poke and prod individual atoms around to form such useful, unnatural constructs as carbon nanotubes and buckyballs, or even engage in trivial matters such as spelling out "IBM" in atoms.
What can be construed as a "loss of inforamation" may simply (lol, what a choice of word) be an indicaion of the quantum nature of "meaning" and of how chaos plays a role at all levels.
> It does seem strange that:
>
> - The lower level facts fix the higher level facts
In a probablistic view, it's not strange at all. Neither are the exceptions to that rule -- they are improbable, but not impossible.
> - Sometimes the higher level facts give more information than the lower level facts (as a matter of principle and this would be the case for idealised reasoners with perfect information)No need for idealised reasoners. Crushed rocks make a brick. Many bricks make a house. The habitation of houses by people make homes. Collections of homes make a city, and so on.
Higher-level concepts in your system exhibit a one-to-many relationship with lower-level phenomena, not a one-to-one match.
> Or...
>
> Am I completely nuts?This **is** Babble, after all. Alternative hypotheses cannot be ruled out. =^P
Getting back to models as useful fictions. Brain imaging allows for the testing and measurement of models of the mind. Some people see progress and even evidence of their usefulness increasing. Seems like they haven't reached a "critical mass" of usefulness for you. Whether the "colors" are arbitrary or not, they are simply representations of difference, and its the differences in what is being measured that provides support for one view while, perhaps, ruling out a competing view.
Modern physics began with apparatus such as Milliken's Oil Drop Experiment, but look where it is now. Comparatively, we may be back as far as Newton in terms of understanding the brain.
Posted by SLS on September 2, 2006, at 6:33:49
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
I don't see why it cannot be understood that mental illnesses can result from abnormalities or perturbations that can occur at any point along the network of processes from the chemical to the behavioral. It is true that the mind is the product of emergent properties, but it is, afterall, comprised of the building blocks of life. If the blocks are defective, the whole thing comes falling down. Fortunately, both the reductionist and the psychosocial perspectives are in place to research problems involving the microscopic and the macroscopic. Of course, there are people who integrate both into their approach to understanding mental illness. It's not that hard.
- Scott
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:58:27
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 14:44:55
> > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.
> This is not funny to sufferers of OCD. Please be civil about it.I wasn't laughing at people with OCD. I was intending to convey... Nervous laughter about the information conveyed by pictures of fMRI's more generally.
> It seems to me you have not ever studied OCD.Thats right, I haven't.
> Nonetheless their brains will light up like a candle in the caudate nucleus.
Whose brains? Every person with a dx of OCD? Is that really right? The colour scheme is arbitrary but the chosen colour scheme does indeed convey 'light up like a candle'. I wonder what that means?
> I could even make a profound statement that would be considered racist that there are genetic variations and things that can be imaged across race.
There are more noticible differences (in genes etc) of people from within a race than there are noticible differences (in genes etc) between races.
I wonder whether it might be the same with the brains of people with a particular kind of mental disorder.
> But in the same light, OCD is experienced regardless of ethnicity or location.
There isn't variation in prevalence rates?
> Without getting profoundly annoyed and uncivil...
Thanks for not doing that.
> I do believe this is a partial ruse thread
Please don't jump to conclusions about my intention.
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:59:34
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by SLS on September 1, 2006, at 16:43:00
> > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
> They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
So the scans show the temperature of different parts of your brain?
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 12:39:38
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 19:41:35
> We do differ on a few key points. If what you mean by "fact" is an indisputable truth, I'd say you can have those in logics and semantics but not in science.
Oh dear... What do I mean by 'fact'. I guess I think facts are objective. There are dogs. That is a fact. We might believe that the proposition 'there are dogs' is true (in which case we would be right), we might believe that the proposition 'there are dogs' is false (in which case we would be wrong). So I guess I think that facts are objective and mind-independent whereas how we get to know facts is a difficult problem.
2+2=4 is a fact. It is arbitrary that the character '2' picks out the number two, and it is arbitrary that the character '+' picks out the mathematical function that it does. But *given that* the characters have the meaning that they do it is a fact (indeed a necessary fact) that 2+2=4.
Water = H2O is a fact. It is arbitrary that the word 'water' picks out the substance in the world. But *given that* the word attaches to the substance that it does it is a fact (indeed a necessary fact) that water = H2O.
(The Water = H2O example is controversial. Some people say Water = Whatever the best scientific theory tells us it is. It might be that future scientific theorising will show us that Water doesn't = H2O at all, rather it = something that we can't comprehend as yet. Regardless, the notion is that Water = Whatever the best scientific theory tells us it is and whatever that turns out to be it is a necessary fact that it is what it actually is).
> science is based on falsifiability and not verification...
Well... Both are used. There are studies where people claim they have found evidence to support their hypothesis.
> And objectivity is a fiction since all observation is theory-laden
Though it might be an objective matter which theory is the best.
> A closely related second point is that rationality is also a fiction based on the epistemology of empiricism.
?
There are objective measures of rationality. If I say 'I believe it is raining and I believe it is wet, but I don't believe it is wet' then something has gone wrong...Some people think of scientific models as useful fictions. Other people think of scientific models as mathematical objects.
> But, to continue the thought experiment and acknowledging that some "Primary Mover" started physics off on its merry way some 13.5 billion years ago...
Yeah. That hypothesis lies outside science. If you ask 'What was the cause of the first event within the natural world' then (if there was one) it is going to be a supernatural cause (hence it will lie beyond science) by definition.
> And assuming perfect replication and rigid determinism of a higher level by its predecessor.
The relation between levels is thought to be one of constitution (hence there is a one way logical dependence) rather than something like a causal dependence. As such there is no room for the higher levels to not be determined (in the logical sense) by the lower levels. No room to manouver at all. Can I think of an example... 2+2... = 4 as a matter of logic. So the precise arrangement of subatomic particles over to my right determine that there is a phone there. No room at all for the subatomic particles to be the way they are yet for a phone not to be there. But while 2+2=4 it is also the case that 1+1+1+1=4 and hence you can't work back from the phone (4) to the precise arrangement of subatomic particles (how you got the product of a sum).
>as long as you do not assume rigid determinism and perfect replication.
It is controversial whether indeterminacies on the sub-atomic level percolate up to indeterminacies on the atomic level. It is controversial whether the sub-atomic level is irreducibly indeterministic or whether there are missing variables. Mutation on the level of genes... Is probably logically dependent on deterministic processes at the level of atoms. It is possible that indeterminacies on the quantum level... Is logically dependent on deterministic processes at some lower level that we haven't managed to figure as yet.
> I don't know the chemical equivalents, but obviously in biology we have random mutations based on probabiltiy and by interactions with external agents (carcinogens, energetic photons).
Sometimes what people mean by 'random' is 'we can't find a pattern'. That doesn't entail that there isn't a pattern there to be found...
> Crushed rocks make a brick. Many bricks make a house. The habitation of houses by people make homes. Collections of homes make a city, and so on.
I like that example :-)
> Higher-level concepts in your system exhibit a one-to-many relationship with lower-level phenomena, not a one-to-one match.Yeah. That is called 'multiple realisability' or probably 'realizability' in US english.
A problem with the brain is neural plasticity. Different brains are like... Different trees or shrubs where there is similarity in overall shape and in certain features but also vast differences in how different individuals brains are wired. Like branches and twigs and leaves. There is considerable variation across the population. Considerable. One person might have a lesion in one particular site with a precise functional deficit as a consequence and another person might have a lesion in a similar site with no functional deficit as a consequence. Of course one could try and say that there are differences it is just that they are too small for us to notice. That might be right but it seems that a better explanation is that different peoples brains are wired differently so you can't map function very well between individuals. It is very complicated.Take A B C D E as people with x disorder.
Do an fMRI scan of them.
Superimpose one scan on another scan on the next scan etc (average the results).
You end up with a model (one scan) of 'people with x disorder'.Take F G H I J as normal controls.
Do an fMRI scan of them.
Superimpose one scan on another scan on the next scan etc (average the results).
You end up with a control (one scan) of 'normal people'.What I worry about is...
Take K L M N O as normal controls2.
Do an fMRI scan of them.
Superimpose one scan on another scan on the next scan etc (average the results).
You end up with controls2 (one scan) of 'normal people2'.Are there noticable differences between 'normal people' and 'normal people2'? I don't know the unit of measurement... What is the scan supposed to show? Neural activation (deduced from metabolisation of sugar or somesuch...). I don't know the scale... But you need to decide on how to assign colours to numerical differences. How you decide that will make a considerable difference for how normals and normals2 look similar / different. Kind of like choosing an appropriate scale so your graph is visually most striking.
Are there more differences between 'disorder x' and 'normals' than there is between 'normals' and 'normals2'? Just how similar is F to G anyway?
Is it more likely that A will have a brain more similar to 'normal' or to 'disorder x'?
I don't know... But these are my worries about the significance of fMRI findings. (Yes I appreciate that sample size is much larger).
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 12:44:34
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 12:39:38
Lets say that A's brain is more normal than similar to the average of disorder x.
Lets say that the average of disorder x have 'heightened activity in region y'.
Lets say that people say 'people with disorder x have heightened activity in region y'.
Lets say that people say 'individual A has disorder x because they have heightened activity in region y'.
Lets say that individual A is given drug B because drug B reduces activity in region y.
Er... How do we know that drug B reduces activity in region y?? Does it do this for each individual in a group or on the basis of averages once more?
Even if individual A does have heightened activity in region Y what does that do for A?
There might be another individual Z that has heightened activity in region Y yet this person is a model of psychological health.
What would reducing activity in region Y do for Z?
Doesn't anybody else worry about this?
Am I missing something?
(Lol more to the point... What am I missing?)
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 12:56:18
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by SLS on September 2, 2006, at 6:33:49
We don't have very good models of any disorder on any level of analysis. I mean... There are models but they aren't particularly good. I guess people are trying to make them better. Hard to know whether you want a model on one level of explanation (so you have a model for each level of explanation) or whether you could make a model that is interlevel.
> Fortunately, both the reductionist and the psychosocial perspectives are in place to research problems involving the microscopic and the macroscopic. Of course, there are people who integrate both into their approach to understanding mental illness. It's not that hard.
Well... There is still a lot of division. Different people work within different frameworks and talk past each other a little and ignore each others results etc.
Sure, progress is being made. But there is still a lot of talking past.
I'm not sure that I've nailed a justification for multi-leveled models given supervenience (logical dependence of high level processes on low level processes). I mean... There is a pragmatic argument but I'd like a logical one too.
I'm also interested in whether different levels might be fundamental for different disorders or whether every disorder is best given an interlevel explanation.
It can be hard to see how to offer a good detailed interlevel model.
E.g., there are good cognitive models of autism as theory of mind deficit. I don't know whether they have done neuro-imaging to try and localise a 'theory of mind' module... Some people think there is a theory of mind module. They might be cognitive psychologists, however, I'm not sure how neuroscience feels about a purported localisation of a theory of mind module. If neuroscience can't find one then...
Have they falsified the cognitive explanation...
Or is cognitive psychology sufficiently autonomous from neuroscience to be able to say 'different individuals brains implement theory of mind differently'.Dunno.
There were social models of autism. Don't know if there are anymore (I'm thinking of the 'old' theory about parenting. Don't know whether more research has been done into social factors though).
Seems possible that different things could be relevant to different individuals.
Lets say the following are causal factors for anxiety (in the sense of being sufficient but not necessary)
- endocrine system
- crappy environmentare there two kinds of anxiety (the first kind and the second kind) or is anxiety multiply realised? don't know... but taxonomy might change...
i think someone or other claimed to have found... 5 kinds of premenstrual disorder (mental health kind of disorder)
But it is funny that most people get to be NOS.
Posted by yxibow on September 2, 2006, at 13:54:27
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 12:56:18
> We don't have very good models of any disorder on any level of analysis. I mean... There are models but they aren't particularly good. I guess people are trying to make them better. Hard to know whether you want a model on one level of explanation (so you have a model for each level of explanation) or whether you could make a model that is interlevel.
Well we have fairly good models of OCD but its not clear to me that you may have not read any of the references pointed out.
We have some, but not all models of schizophrenia, having been studied for many decades, starting with rather poor medicational approaches to more modern and humane treatment methods. Schizophrenia is one of the few neurochemical disorders that can theoretically to the best of my knowledge be seen on MRIs simply because some forms are neurodegenerative. But they can certainly be seen on SPECT/PET.
> There were social models of autism. Don't know if there are anymore (I'm thinking of the 'old' theory about parenting. Don't know whether more research has been done into social factors though).
>
> Seems possible that different things could be relevant to different individuals.
Its possible, but I do believe we will find, and already are starting to find genetic reasons for autism. It is the flat earth society reasoning, pardon the phraseology however, that continues to blame from fluoride in the water to nonexistant levels of methanol from aspartame for every possible cause of autism or developmental disorders because they want desperately and understandably to find a reason.
> Lets say the following are causal factors for anxiety (in the sense of being sufficient but not necessary)
>
> - endocrine system
> - crappy environment
>
> are there two kinds of anxiety (the first kind and the second kind) or is anxiety multiply realised? don't know... but taxonomy might change...
ALL anxiety whether introduced environmentally ("crappy environment" -- please dont assume what peoples environment are like or how they assimilate their surroundings or life upbringings, that is insulting) or by "a faulty endocrine system" which I assume you mean thyroidal are inherently as neurochemical as this seemingly antediluvian thread. The thoughts you bring to the table came from free will, which in turn came from your mind cogitating, which produced brain activity and neuronal firing and can be seen on an EKG and a SPECT scan.
> But it is funny that most people get to be NOS.Do please refrain from continuing to use the word funny in your hypothesis, its not amusing to those who are on here and are diagnosed with a disorder yet to be determined. There are various DSM-IV and DSM-V disorders that are indeed NOS. They don't fit into a regular category of a DSM diagnosis, e.g. psychosis NOS. Until perhaps more is diagnosed in the term of treatment.
Posted by SLS on September 2, 2006, at 16:02:42
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » SLS, posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:59:34
> > > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
>
> > They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
>
> So the scans show the temperature of different parts of your brain?Yes.
- Scott
Posted by SLS on September 2, 2006, at 16:43:01
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » SLS, posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:59:34
> > > > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
> >
> > > They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
> >
> > So the scans show the temperature of different parts of your brain?
>
> Yes.Well, ok, no.
Wait!
Ok.
No.
I'm sure you understood the concept. The colors were not chosen arbitrarily. The colors do have meaning in our society.
- Scott
Posted by finelinebob on September 2, 2006, at 18:41:59
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » SLS, posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:59:34
> > > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
>
> > They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
>
> So the scans show the temperature of different parts of your brain?
>Pardon me, but let me just interject some color theory into the mix. Lots of ways of describing color, but let's talk about HSV/HSB -- hue (color), saturation (intensity of the color compared to gray=0) and value or brightness (where it is on a scale from black to white) --the common colorspace for Photoshop, for instance. What I find interesting about most color mapping techniques is that while Hue is used to map different values of what is measured, Saturation is always at like 100%. To choose red to indicate high amounts of X being measured and violet to measure low amounts of X being measured, that choice might be completely arbitrary although the visual spectrum is "respected" in mapping colors inbetween deep violet and deep red.
But choosing red for "hot" meaning high energy levels and blue for "cool" or low energy levels is not completely arbitrary. In Western Culture, those two color-energy relationships are widely prevalent, so picking them to represent level of activity for whatever your machine measures, converting the numerical to the visual, is a natural "bias" to follow. People can relate to it readily.
What may NOT be arbitrary, tho, is the Brightness. I don't see this so much with, say, mapping non-visible wavelengths of radiation to the visible spectrum for x-ray spectroscopy of stellar objects. However, with mapping brain scanning technologies and what they measure to the visual spectrum, there is a distinct bias in lowering the Brightness of "cooler" areas. Although the colors remain vivd as much as they can, they do fade to black.
AFAIK, there is no scientific reason for this. Changing the brightness not only does not add to the interpretation of, say, a PET scan, it actually introduces a non-existent variable or, rather, a variable indicating the "goodness" or the "badness" implicated by the colors.
Any particular unstable radioisotope will decay, and the decay event may have a variety of outcomes. We know of isotopes whose decay events have one particular outcome that accounts for, say, 90% of all possible outcomes. That decay event will release a photon of a precise wavelength. When such an isotope in introduced into the bloodstream, areas of increased bloodflow will naturally display a greater number of events than areas with decreased bloodflow.
In other words, we are looking at a single dimension, a single degree of variation: the number of decay events. Any visual mapping of that information requires exactly one visual element to be altered. So, all any brainscan needs to do would be to map event counts to Hue OR Saturation OR Brightness. The use of Hue AND Brightness (with red having B near 100 and violet having B near 0) introduces a bias ... which I think depending on the situation can favor a favorable or unfavorable dx. An "unbiased" mapping would have no "fade to black" -- in those edges of the brain/skull/scalp where the bloodflow terminates, there is no topographical reason not to maintain an equal value for all hues until you hit a region of no recorded events; which could be white or black according to your preference as the mapper.
That being said, I have no problem with biases in scientific observations since I don't believe in objectivity -- but you need to acknowledge your biases for what they are if you're going to have any degree of intellectual integrity or honesty.
As an aside, I always find it a bit amusing that red tends to be assigned to high evergy levels and violet to low energy levels. The physicist in me just wants to giggle at how they got it backwards.
Posted by finelinebob on September 2, 2006, at 23:31:37
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on September 2, 2006, at 18:41:59
... I'm out.
It's been fun, but I don't get paid enough by Babble to spend the time I just spent getting halfway thru a response before I realized enough was enough.
;^)
You can take the academic out of the academy, but that ain't gonna shut him up....
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