![[dr. bob]](/dr-bob-sm.gif)
Dr. Bob is Robert Hsiung, MD,
bob@dr-bob.orgShown: posts 2 to 26 of 52. Go back in thread:
Posted by Estella on August 28, 2006, at 2:55:38
In reply to Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 28, 2006, at 2:04:03
> It might be that for a long time yet... Maybe even forever as a matter of principle (ie not just due to the current state of our knowledge) the best way to treat mental illness is to...
> Talk to people.
Sorry. I should have been clearer. I meant for the disorders at which the psychological level provides the most robust generalisations. Actually... I don't know whether the level of explanation implies anything for the level of treatment or not. But anyhoo...
(I'm not really opposed to meds. I guess I just wanted to make that clear. I guess I just think it is a shame - and it probably misguided to think that medication is the only or best treatment)
Posted by yxibow on August 28, 2006, at 16:16:07
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 28, 2006, at 2:55:38
> > It might be that for a long time yet... Maybe even forever as a matter of principle (ie not just due to the current state of our knowledge) the best way to treat mental illness is to...
>
> > Talk to people.
>
> Sorry. I should have been clearer. I meant for the disorders at which the psychological level provides the most robust generalisations. Actually... I don't know whether the level of explanation implies anything for the level of treatment or not. But anyhoo...
>
> (I'm not really opposed to meds. I guess I just wanted to make that clear. I guess I just think it is a shame - and it probably misguided to think that medication is the only or best treatment)
Medication is never the only treatment in a proper program for psychiatric disorders, regardless that all have fundamental and impermeable underpinnings in brain function or brain differences which cause neurochemical imbalances that can be treated to whatever 2006 has in its medication arsenal.A true program always integrates psychodynamic, behavioural, and other forms of psychological therapy adjunctive to medication, the medication which makes life livable enough to deal with the psychological and perhaps even environmental factors that triggered a brain chemical disorder.
We have evidence dating back now at least 15-20 years of things like PET studies showing a "control" and a person with fairly strong OCD, giving each say, a dirty towel or something that sets off the psychological factor which then sets of the biological and neuronal level changes in the caudate nucleus. The differences are dramatic. Such studies also show the similarities and differences of a followup study of someone treated with medication, someone treated with behavioural therapy, someone treated with both, someone treated with control, and these are very visible. I happened to work for someone in that key field so I saw these scans, they were quite demonstrable. And such work has continued with more modern equipment on other conditions.
So I know I have a lifetime imbalance that will change over time and hopefully shift for the better during those periods. But that doesn't mean I may also not be of need of psychological adjunctive therapy which I recognize and that is the part I agree with.
It's just a shame that the current HMO 15 minutes once or twice a month and write a prescription is the current model. Its also the current model of most GP services for a once a year 15 minute physical how-are-you-doing, let me examine you, thanks, especially in large cities. The days of the doctor with the bag who came to your house are largely gone except for subsidized programs for shutins, seniors, etc.
-- Jay.
Posted by finelinebob on August 28, 2006, at 23:04:09
In reply to Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 28, 2006, at 2:04:03
Mind-body dualism does not need to be "true" for a theory of mind. The fact that we do not understand how neurology and chemistry interact to form "mind" doesn't mean that mind is not a valid model to work with. Particularly with studies that show of brain plasticity (rewiring itself to perform tasks destroyed by damaged neurons), there is a growing body of evidence that suggests childhood "critical periods" aren't the only places where and when environment places a firm stamp on one's mind and it's capabilities or disabilities.
Certainly, science from the time of Bacon and Galileo onward, even from the time of ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, discovered many things about the microscopic world and below without having a clear view of what the "atom" was ... and it you know the root of the word "atom" then you know they had no idea the rabbit hole went even deeper.
As I mentioned on a different thread, a physicist at a recent conference was quoted as say, "The world is not as real as we think it is."
One thing that is clear about mind is that people respond to the perception of truth more than empiricle truth. Even Einstein had trouble accepting quantum mechanics when it was becoming ever more clear that it was our best explanation of "reality". Perception and beliefs trump reality most of the time.
One interesting notion to consider, if you want to lift your consideration of your disorder above a biological reduction to the alchemy/chemistry of psychopharmacology is to consider the views of mind developed in the Soviet Union, where the collective (going ages back beyond the rise of communism) was more important than the individual, is that "mind" exists between people. There is no "mind" within a single person, other than what you might play back as "thought experiments" or relived experiences. Mind is a purely social phenomenon.
Posted by Estella on August 30, 2006, at 2:49:12
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on August 28, 2006, at 16:16:07
Hellos :-)
> A true program always integrates psychodynamic, behavioural, and other forms of psychological therapy adjunctive to medication... the medication which makes life livable enough to deal with the psychological and perhaps even environmental factors that triggered a brain chemical disorder.
Yeah. Biopsychosocial model. (Biology, psychology, socio-cultural). Some add a spiritual dimension but I haven't seen a convincing line drawn between psychology and spirituality so... I guess that is right. Some reductionists, however, think that biology is the fundamental level. If it doesn't target biology then there is little point to it.
But yeah, that doesn't seem right...
The scan studies are interesting. Do you have references? It is hard to know whether the neurology is merely correlated with the behavioural dysfunction (and hence wouldn't be a candidate for a causal mechanism) or whether it occurs prior to behavioural change.
> It's just a shame that the current HMO 15 minutes once or twice a month and write a prescription is the current model.,,Yes. It is a shame.
I think it is a shame the socio-cultural facts are probably the most neglected of all as well. Probably because of the crazy social constructionists out there who align themselves with the anti-psychiatry movement much to their detriment...
Thanks for your thoughts :-)
Posted by Estella on August 30, 2006, at 3:11:03
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on August 28, 2006, at 23:04:09
Hellos :-)
Dualism vs Materialism is a hard one... Still... Seems that in the psychological / psychiatric literature they have something special and specific in mind that is outdated philosophy of mind.
I remember going to a lecture a while back on abnormal psychology. The lecturer said, quite clearly, that the reason for less psychosomatic illnesses now (compared with the time of Freud) was because of the rise of dualism. I said:
Firstly, people are LESS LIKELY to be dualists now than they were back then. Due to the success of science roughly half first year philosophy students surveyed are dualists and roughly half are materialists. People were MORE LIKELY to have been dualists back then due to scientific psychology not having been developed and due to the influence of Descartes. Secondly, one would expect MORE psychosomatic illnesses when Dualism is prevalent (which is precisely what you find) because people don't understand the INTERACTION between mind and body. People in Freuds day were less likely to understand that the physical can affect the mental and vice versa. The idea that psychological factors could result in bodily paralysis, for example, would be more surprising back then (hence less likely to have been picked up on / challenged) than it is now.I thought she had simply got things wrong but I've read other people saying the same thing. I don't understand why they say that there has been a rise in dualism in western culture and I think part of it might be that I don't really understand what on earth they mean by dualism.
In philosophy... The most notable dualist is probably Dave Chalmers. Aside from him (and his followers though don't quote me on that) materialism seems to be the accepted view. He also writes on what implications dualism has for science, however. His variety of dualism doesn't affect things overly much. He says that science is fairly much in the business of finding the neural correlates of consciousness and good luck to them they should keep on with that. His main issue is that it is a seperate matter whether we are going to find correlates of consciousness and he resists making the identity (ie concluding that the reason for the correlation is that they are the same thing). He thinks that conscious properties (like phenomenal red) are irreducible mental properties of this world the same way that physical properties (like mass and charge) are irreducible physical properties of this world. He doesn't deny that mental properties seem to arise from our complex brains, but he does resist the conclusion that the only way you could get mental properties is to have a complex brain like ours. If you would like there to be prospects for AI or if you would like to leave it open that there might be alien creatures with radically different organs to our brains that support mentality then you might just want to agree with him... Doesn't seem to affect psychiatry, however.
> there is a growing body of evidence that suggests childhood "critical periods" aren't the only places where and when environment places a firm stamp on one's mind and it's capabilities or disabilities.
Absolutely. With respect to phenotypes (the way genes express in phenotypes) too. Hard to seperate out nature vs nurture ultimately. Same with trying to keep socio-culture and psychology apart too. I mean surely the social aspects that are relevant are the social aspects that are represented in the persons psychology. And surely being represented in the persons psychology is a biological aspect as much as a psychological one. How to keep those things distinct can be a problem at the end of the day...
> a physicist at a recent conference was quoted as say, "The world is not as real as we think it is."Lol. Physicists don't study mind independent reality they only study inter subjective reality. That is okay... But they don't even make metaphysical claims (or at least they aren't qualified to do so). Physicists are typically pragmatists. They find formula that are great for predicting (hence explaining) the behaviour of particles etc. If you ask them 'what has to be true of the world and what objects have to exist in our world in order for the formula to work?' they don't know any more than the next guy. They just go with pragmatics / utility. Like the Shrodingers cat thing. What is the difference between saying that it is in both states at once and between saying that it is in one state but WE DON'T KNOW WHICH STATE UNTIL WE LOOK? The first sounds crazy (and are they entitled to collapse the epistemology / metaphysics distinction) the second sounds less crazy (but a consequence is that there may be facts about the world that we can know nothing about).
Though apparantly it gets more complicated... And I don't know much about physics...
> One interesting notion to consider, if you want to lift your consideration of your disorder above a biological reduction to the alchemy/chemistry of psychopharmacology is to consider the views of mind developed in the Soviet Union, where the collective (going ages back beyond the rise of communism) was more important than the individual, is that "mind" exists between people. There is no "mind" within a single person, other than what you might play back as "thought experiments" or relived experiences. Mind is a purely social phenomenon.Someone or other wrote about group minds... Can't remember who... Might be a bit much of an abuse of language, however... Searle is fairly interesting "The Construction of Social Reality". Mind is essentially social. In the sense that language is essentially social (controversial but that is meant to be the upshot of Wittgenstein's private language argument)
Though... It is very controversial...
Posted by yxibow on August 30, 2006, at 18:32:18
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on August 30, 2006, at 2:49:12
> Hellos :-)
>
> > A true program always integrates psychodynamic, behavioural, and other forms of psychological therapy adjunctive to medication... the medication which makes life livable enough to deal with the psychological and perhaps even environmental factors that triggered a brain chemical disorder.
>
> Yeah. Biopsychosocial model. (Biology, psychology, socio-cultural). Some add a spiritual dimension but I haven't seen a convincing line drawn between psychology and spirituality so... I guess that is right. Some reductionists, however, think that biology is the fundamental level. If it doesn't target biology then there is little point to it.
>
> But yeah, that doesn't seem right...
>
> The scan studies are interesting. Do you have references? It is hard to know whether the neurology is merely correlated with the behavioural dysfunction (and hence wouldn't be a candidate for a causal mechanism) or whether it occurs prior to behavioural change.
References -- certainly, the doctors have moved on since to private practice as well, but you can see some of the old images herehttp://hope4ocd.com/overview.php
http://www.brainmattersinc.com/ocd.html
These have no references attached but I can say that I have seen these many times. The color images are probably in more older journals such asBrain imaging as a tool in establishing a theory of brain pathology in obsessive compulsive disorder.
J Clin Psychiatry. 1990 Feb;51 Suppl:22-5; discussion 26.J Clin Psychiatry. 1994 Oct;55 Suppl:54-9. Links
Positron emission tomography studies of cerebral glucose metabolism in obsessive compulsive disorder.* Baxter LR Jr.
Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences.
"In the last 7 years, positron emission tomography (PET) scanning studies of obsessive compulsive disorder have given us new insights into misfunctionings of brain systems that may mediate the symptomatic expression of this classical "neurosis." Work by several PET groups indicates that a prefrontal cortex-basal ganglia-thalamic circuit may be the brain pathway leading to the broken record patterns of obsessions and compulsions."
And ongoing research continues
http://www.mentalhealth.ucla.edu/projects/anxiety/ocdresearch.htm
So while I can't put an old glossy Grand Rounds or journal link here, there are many references to PET scans of OCD pointing at the caudate nucleus.-- J
Posted by finelinebob on August 30, 2006, at 21:09:23
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on August 30, 2006, at 3:11:03
> Hellos :-)
back at'cha
> Dualism vs Materialism is a hard one...
Because it perpetuates another philosophical mistake common in Western thought, which is to merge epistemology with ontology, knowing with being. Empiricism repudiates "true" knowledge of reality outside of studied experience and, in that, is more opposed to positivism than dualism. Dualism is somewhat of a straw man for a materialist argument because (1) the "Mind" in dualism is not subject to sensation while "Body" is, and (2) in promoting that knowing IS being, it rejects that there might be a reality currently beyond measurability.
> I remember going to a lecture a while back on abnormal psychology. The lecturer said, quite clearly, that the reason for less psychosomatic illnesses now (compared with the time of Freud) was because of the rise of dualism.Yep, that lecturer missed the boat on that. There is also caught up in the popularization of Decartes' dualism the religious importance of such a dualism. To this day, dualism is firmly entrenched in theological thought. Perhaps this where any misconception of a "rise" in dualism in modern times comes from. Particularly when compared to a much more solidified and better represented opposition to such thought, the dualism is drawn into greater focus than from times when most everyone considered such a distinction to be "natural" in a "Godly" way. It not so much a rise of dualism, but a rise in opposition to it.
> > a physicist at a recent conference was quoted as say, "The world is not as real as we think it is."
>
> Lol. Physicists don't study mind independent reality they only study inter subjective reality.
Is there any other kind? Even if you accept a role -- even a partially deterministic role -- for biology, any introduction of a sociocultural element makes our perception of reality intersubjective. As much as some scientists still cling to an examinable reality existing independent of one's sociocultural biases, that in itself (objectivity) is a sociocultural construct.
> Someone or other wrote about group minds... Can't remember who... Might be a bit much of an abuse of language, however... Searle is fairly interesting "The Construction of Social Reality". Mind is essentially social. In the sense that language is essentially social (controversial but that is meant to be the upshot of Wittgenstein's private language argument)It's too bad the references in the Amazon catalog for Searle's work mostly cite himself, but that is characteristic of books written for a broader audience than one's colleagues. Seeing a few of Gergen's books as "suggested" other readings does pin it down a little more for me, tho.
My own understanding comes from the psychologist Lev Vygotsky ("Mind in Society" and "Thought and Language") and the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin (sorry, haven't read any original work, but this is a good one "Dialogism").
Bakhtin poses an interesting question that digs into the notion of a social mind: "When someone speaks, who is doing the talking?" The answer is at least two people: the speaker and the listener. We couch our language, our choice of words or phrases or modes of expression or even level of depth based upon who we perceive our audience to be and how we think we might best communicate to meet our needs (in the least) and their needs (at best). It's Vygotsky, though, that extends that notion to all of mind: that mind exists between people and is defined in terms of cultural and sociological circumstances as much as biological circumstances.
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 18:29:12
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on August 30, 2006, at 18:32:18
Thanks.
I'm kinda interested in what they have to say about 'high energy use in the brain of a typical person with OCD'. What they mean seems to not be 'typical person' so much as 'idealised average person in OCD group compared to idealised average person in control group'. I wonder who the 'normal control group consisted in? Non patient population or patient population with different disorder?
I'm kinda interested in the notion that the brain differences are sometimes considered to be a CAUSE of the disorder when the brain changes aren't located in the individuals and I'm also interested in what neuro-imaging helps with respect to explanation.
I went to a seminar a while back on neural imaging and explanation. People were fairly good at telling a good explanation from a bad explanation 9where the bad explanations weren't relevant to the issue). What was interesting was that if you added an irrelevant brain imaging fact then people judged the explanation to be better than it was before. People actually seemed to think that adding an irrelevant brain imaging fact turned a bad explanation into a good one. This finding was constant across first year psychology majors, students taking a mid-level neuropsych course both at the beginning and end of the course. The only people who thought the explanations got WORSE for the addition of irrelevant information (which is the right way to look at it) were the neuroscience experts (PhD students and profs).
Freaky, huh.
I wonder what task people are doing when he neuroimaging comes back...
I wonder how much variation there is between the averages if you compare two 'normal' populations?
I wonder how much variation there is if you set the threshold for activity a little higher / lower?
I wonder what the visual effect would be of selecting different colours for levels of activation (and I wonder how colour maps onto areas of activation). Let me guess... The impressive red bit is... High activity? Or is that supposed to be low?
Thanks for the links.
I'll try and access teh journals too at some point.
:-)
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 19:04:30
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on August 30, 2006, at 21:09:23
> To this day, dualism is firmly entrenched in theological thought.
Yeah. Though there is a move to attempting to
understand religion in evolutionary terms. Over extension of the theory of mind module etc etc. Yeah, people do tend to be dualist on religious grounds. Typically substance dualists on religious grounds while property dualism is more associated with... er... theorietical sophistication, I guess. I don't know any philosophers who hold that the mind / soul is an immaterial substance.I would have thought atheism / agnosticism / humanism would have been on the rise... Hence... I would have thought that as science marches on people would be inclined to adopt materialism and give up their dualism (their substance dualism at any rate). I don't really know though. I figure back 100 years ago all members of the class would have been substance dualists.
> Is there any other kind?Well... There is subjective reality, inter-subjective reality, objective reality. I think those distinctions all make sense. Scientists build replication and repeatability and inter-rater reliability etc into their observations so their observations need to be repeatable by others following the same method. That means that they aren't just studying subjective reality because others study the same portion of the world and typically agree (fairly much). So... Inter-subjective. Hard to study objective reality though... I guess we study objective reality in the sense in which the natural world counts as objective (would have existed without people) whereas socially constructed reality might be studying society and culture and money and institutions and stuff like that. Not that there aren't objective facts about institutions and the like, but they are social constructions in the sense that they wouldn't have existed if people hadn't made them up.
Searle is okay. Sometimes he isn't particularly rigerous though so it can be hard to pin down what he is saying...
> My own understanding comes from the psychologist Lev Vygotsky ("Mind in Society" and "Thought and Language") and the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin (sorry, haven't read any original work, but this is a good one "Dialogism").
Hrm. I haven't heard of either of those.
> Bakhtin poses an interesting question that digs into the notion of a social mind: "When someone speaks, who is doing the talking?" The answer is at least two people: the speaker and the listener. We couch our language, our choice of words or phrases or modes of expression or even level of depth based upon who we perceive our audience to be and how we think we might best communicate to meet our needs (in the least) and their needs (at best). It's Vygotsky, though, that extends that notion to all of mind: that mind exists between people and is defined in terms of cultural and sociological circumstances as much as biological circumstances.Ah. I guess that sounds okay so much as they aren't meaning to commit to anything like the Benjamin Worf hypothesis
http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Students/njp0001.html
A guess... It is a model of communication. I haven't done any sociology. Just looked at some of it in psychology. Need to do some reading...
:-)
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 20:17:58
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on August 30, 2006, at 18:32:18
Sorry - I should have said thanks very much for passing on the links. I wasn't quibbling about the links so much as I was relating my concerns with neuro-imaging in general.
The person who I heard talk was fairly sceptical of neuro-imaging in general, but then she is a cognitive psychologist.
Posted by finelinebob on August 31, 2006, at 20:59:55
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 19:04:30
> > Is there any other kind?
>
> Well... There is subjective reality, inter-subjective reality, objective reality.But from a sociocultural viewpoint, any notion of "subjective" is replaced early by intersubjectve. "Meaning" becomes internalized as we are introduced into a subculture, yet the thought "sign" the meaning is hooked to remains intact or even enriched. For example, I have an "inner speech" sign of what work is, and that "inner speech" is nothing really like how I would describe it in outer thought. Expressing what "work" means, however, depends on a cultural context -- am I at my job, doing gardening, or studying mechanics in physics? Vygotsky, unlike Whorf, accepts the existence of an "objective" reality but that reality can only be given meaning within a culture and its modes of expression. Again, the notion of "mind" is not so much "groupthink" as is it a development of an intersubjective meaning-space that helps define that subculture from other subcultures. The book "Thought and Language", in fact, is often referred to as an unfortunate misinterpretation -- a more accurate one being "Thinking and Speech". So, Vygotsky can be seen as similar to Whorf as being subscribing to a liguistic relativity, but there are key differences in the base assumptions as well as the "units of measurements": lignuistic phrases for Whorf, and units of meaning for Vygotsky.
Toss into that Bakhtin and his students' developments of the functions of language, and things can get rather interesting. Too put things simply, a speaker makes speech act bound within a sociocultural context and the listener receives that -- pure simple social transmission, and not very satisfying. But introduce two functions of speech: the "univocal" and "multivocal" functions. Univocal is kinda "my way or the highway". Multivocal accounts for the listeners possibly having different understandings. And this applies not just to the speaker, because a speech act always involves both the speaker and the listener. A listener can understand a speech act as either function as well. It becomes interesting to consider when purposes are crossed between the two actors. Also interesting is the possibility that even in the case of both actors accepting a univocal relationship, that the listener misconstrues what is meant by the speaker. In a way, it's a linguistic mutation, which allows for movement beyond a purely social transmission argument. In fact, meaning can pe problematized by the intentional "mutation" of the speaker's meaning by that of the listener.
> Hard to study objective reality though...Thus the quote: "The world may not be as real as we think it is."
Scientists work on models. Models aren't the real think, but scientific progress means modfication of a model or its replacement by a model with greater explanatory power. All the same, what scientists use to explain reality may actually look nothing at all like "real reality". That is the basis of one of the fundamental postulates of science: any (or all) theory underdetermines reality.
The top and bottom quarks aren't also referred to as "truth" and "beauty" purely as a jest. Science goes beyond Occam's razor to look not just for simplicity for "truth", but it also looks to beauty. Theories that are simple and beautiful present the verisimilitude of Truth. Even for those who stubbornly cling to objectivism, metaphysics and mysticism still play a role in modern science. Thus the confluence of epistomology (knowing) and ontology (being). Pragmatism is not enough of a justification for melding these two schools into one.
> > My own understanding comes from the psychologist Lev Vygotsky ("Mind in Society" and "Thought and Language") and the semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin (sorry, haven't read any original work, but this is a good one "Dialogism").
>
> Hrm. I haven't heard of either of those.If you're not a developmental, educational or cultural psychologist, or for Bakhtin marxist literary theory or semiotics, then that's likely the case.
> A guess... It is a model of communication.Again, more than that. It's a theoretical basis for the differential development of meaning based in one's culture in order to communicate (the shared mind) while retaining an independence of thought from speech.
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 22:43:29
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on August 31, 2006, at 20:59:55
Thats all kinda interesting :-)
Are you familiar with Quine at all? He writes about 'radical translation' so that if an anthropoligist were to encounter a tribe what she would want to do would be to construct a translation manuel which would provide a way of translating from the natives tongue into english (or whatever).
He writes about how the anthropoligist should go about constructing the translation manuel. You need to try and figure a sign of assent and a sign of dissent. He talks about that a little. Then once you have that established you can try and figure out words for things.
He says that suppose a rabbit runs across the field and the native yells 'Gavagi' and points at it. You now have a number of candidate hypotheses as to what 'Gavagi' means. It could mean 'rabbit' or it could mean 'fetch me my spear!' or it could mean 'Jakes pet'. You need to try and establish which candidate translation is right by engaging in some hypothesis testing. If you know another native has a rabbit in a cage you could take the native to the cage and point at the rabbit and say 'Gavagi' to see whether you get assent or dissent. You are always supposed to radically translate with the assumption that the natives statements are true (principle of charity).
Quine argues that meaning is always underdetermined by stimulus meaning. Gavagi could mean 'rabbit' or it could mean 'undetached rabbit part' or it could mean 'rabbit until time t and duck afterwards' or it could mean 'rabbit on Tuesdays' or whatever. No matter how much empirical investigation we do the stimulus meaning always underdetermines the translation manuel.
Of course we don't typically encounter such radical scepticism... But Quines argument for the indeterminacy of translation (and the indeterminacy of reference) has implications for us understanding one another from WITHIN a language as well. How do I know that I use the word 'rabbit' to mean the same as you when you say 'rabbit'. Even if we agree in all our judgements of what does and does not count as a rabbit that still underdetermines what we mean by rabbit.
So in a way Quines argument kinda makes it surprising that language and communication is possible at all.
I guess you have that on the one hand (undermining the social aspect of language) while on the other you have Wittgenstein (undermining the private aspect of language). This is controversial but I'll try and reconstruct.
In order to use a word there must be something that counts as using the word correctly and something that counts as using the word incorrectly.
The correct / incorrect amounts to the word having a criteria of application.
If I invent a word just for me to label some inner sensation (and there is no translation into a public language) then there is no criteria of correct and incorrect application.
If I say 'there is that sensation again' and apply the word there is no distinction between seeming to apply the word correctly and actually applying the word correctly.
Hence meanings can't be a private individual matter because you need a linguistic community (of two people at least) in order for there to be a criteria of seems right / is right. Hence private languages (which can't be translated into public languages) are impossible.
But then Quine puts pressure on how much you can translate between languages... And how much you can translate between different speakers of the same language.
Then you have Davidson 'on the very possibility of a conceptual scheme' (or similar) saying that languages CAN be translated into other languages and if something can't be translated into another language then it is not a language.
Old stuff... I don't remember it very well. Probably haven't done a very good job of explaining. I need to learn more about the sociology.
I'm interested in the relationship between the following levels:
-Socio-cultural
-Psychological (Intentional stance / personal level / level of folk psychology)
-Cognitive psychology
-Neurobiology / neuroscienceSeems that the facts on the lower levels determine / fix the facts on the higher levels. Most people accept this (and neurobiology facts are fixed by chemical facts are fixed by the facts of physics). But there is controversy over whether different levels are explanatorily autonomous or whether you should always seek a reductive explanation. Is there a fundamental level (or does that depend on the question)? What is the relationship between explanations at each level etc.
Socio-cultural level is the one I"m the least familiar with...
Posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 23:06:17
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 22:43:29
AND...
Should different mental illnesses be explained from different levels or should neurobiology always be the aim?
Does it depend on the question?
I mean... If we ask 'why do white western women have higher incidence of anorexia than women from pakistan' it seems that the socio-cultural level is fundamental (which is just to say most appropriate). If we ask 'why does this particular white western woman have anorexia compared to that white western woman' then the fundamental level of explanation would seem to be... either psychological or cognitive or neuro-biological (I don't want to commit myself to which but my point is that the socio-cultural level wouldn't be fundamental for that question).
Should we aim for explanatory pluralism?
What is the relationship between the different levels?
Do we want multi-level models for all of the disorders?
Are some levels more relevant to some disorders?The modelling stuff is interesting too...
There is a huge literature on models and the relationship that models bear to the world / to the real world phenomena.
Stuff on whether models are abstract objects (mathematical ones) or fictional entities (strings of propositions / descriptions).
Do we compare models directly to the world?
Do we explain phenomena by appealing to the model? If we do this latter thing then what is the relationship between the world and the model?
Are there objective facts about the 'best' model of the phenomena or is the best model relative to our interests etc?Some people think that what psychiatry needs to do is come up with a model of functioning (with reference to cognitive neuropsychology) and then explain various symptoms of the various disorders by appealing to breakdowns in the model. You will be able to read off places to interveane by viewing the model. But that means that models are going to be very abstract entities (or fictions) indeed. What is the relationship between me (as an instance of a disorder) and the model that describes the disorder?
At what level of generality should models be pitched?
Will they be useful (if there is too much individual variation then intervention points on the model might not map too well onto intervention points within the individual)
Lots of questions... No clear answers... Time to do some work ;-)
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 0:41:33
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 20:17:58
> Sorry - I should have said thanks very much for passing on the links. I wasn't quibbling about the links so much as I was relating my concerns with neuro-imaging in general.
>
> The person who I heard talk was fairly sceptical of neuro-imaging in general, but then she is a cognitive psychologist.
>Its fine to have a healthy skepticism of things -- I just happen to differ and I know that these imaging projects and the era, about 10-12 years ago that they were in was a groundbreaking discovery for the population suffering from OCD, which is a lifetime brain disorder, though one can manage it quite well (usually) with behaviour therapy. Tourette's is related as well though its harder to manage as is pure obsessions (garbage thought). I know this personally (OCD that is.)
You can study more about it if you wish at the OC Foundation
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 1:02:08
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 0:41:33
Sorry, what was the groundbreaking discovery?
That if you take a bunch of people with OCD and do brain imaging... Then you figure the averages across the population... Then you decide on your colour scheme... And you do the same with people... Without OCD? With another dx? Then your pretty pics look different?
Er... How does that help?
I just don't understand what the brain imaging shows. Also... If you take a person with OCD chances are their brain is within normal range. It is just averages across populations that have been deemed to be different (and are there systematic differences between averages across different populations?)
Posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 1:18:48
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by Estella on August 31, 2006, at 23:06:17
> Should different mental illnesses be explained from different levels or should neurobiology always be the aim?
>
> Does it depend on the question?Yes, no and no.
If all there was to neurological disorders was faulty wiring/chemistry, we'd still have all the coping mechanisms and behaviors of significant co-actors in our lives and the sociocultural context in which the disorder is interpreted.
I guess I see it this way (figuratively and literally). If you wear glasses, switch to contacts, then put your glasses on with your contacts in, you realize that eyeglasses do more than magnify. Particularly if you have any level of astigmatism, they compensate. So, back to neurology -- say we perfect the science of psychopharmacology and the neurochemistry of brain function and can completely compensate for one's "biological deficits", you still have a lot of psychological work to do; intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural.
> Should we aim for explanatory pluralism?
> What is the relationship between the different levels?
> Do we want multi-level models for all of the disorders?
> Are some levels more relevant to some disorders?Since any one theory will underdetermine reality, then you can get a better model if you can find compatible theories that address different topics.
Take the favorite whipping post of science these days: evolution. Most objections I've heard against evolution violate boundary conditions. Evolution says nothing about how life began. It certainly says nothing about the formation of the earth or our solar system. It says nothing about the big band, nor does it have any escalation at the other end -- inclusive of how will life end and will the universe end as well. If you want a broader scientific explanation of the "Big Picture", you need to include other theories -- and still accept undetermintion.
Models seek their own level of explanatory power. Or, rather, we must limit our use of models to their constraints and boundaries.
Have heard of Quine, particularly in a "history of qualitative science" course. Particularly ontological relativity. Nice set up for more post-post-modern takes on Heidegger and for applying Hermeneutics to social science analytic methods.
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 2:12:36
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism, posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 1:18:48
We might have a different world view.
I'll put consciousness to the side because that is more controversial and I don't know what I believe. Aside from that, you have different levels of explanation like this (of course I'm simplifying and leaving out a lot).
- Social
- Psychological (beliefs, desires, emotions, hopes etc)
- Biological
- Chemical
- PhysicalYou can think of these as different levels. There are different entities at each level and there are different facts (about the states of those entities) at each level. At the level of physics there are facts about what subatomic particles there are and the way in which those subatomic particles behave. Now the thought is that if we were idealised reasoners and we knew all the facts about subatomic particles and how they behave then we would be able to logically deduce what entities there is at the chemical level of explanation and how those entities behave. And if we (as ideal reasoners) were to know all the facts about the entities and behaviour of the entities at the level of chemistry then we would be able to deduce the entities and behaviour of the entities at the level of biology and so forth up the hierarchy.
Another way of saying this is that God (so to speak) didn't have to fix the physical facts on day one then the chemical facts on day two then the biological facts on day three. He just had to fix the facts at the physical level and then all the other facts thereby got fixed for free.
So...
If that is right. As a claim about the way the world is then we might be inclined to think that explanation should bottom out at the physical level as if we knew everything there was to know at the level of physics we would thereby know everything there is to know at higher levels of explanation.
You might think that the trouble is that we are not ideal reasoners and we aren't even close to knowing all the physical facts (and we probably won't get there anytime soon). As such because we have such tiny finite imperfect minds we are best to be explanatory pluralists (offering explanations at all the levels) because we are simply too stupid to make progress at the lower levels of explanation.
Or...
One might think that the levels of explanation are autonomous in the sense that you lose information when you drop from a high level to a lower level of explanation.
One way of seeing this is to note that while you can deduce chemistry from physics and while you can deduce biology from chemistry the deduction doesn't work the other way around. It is possible for there to be a world that is a duplicate of our world at the psychological level but to have a radically different chemistry. It is possible for there to be a world that is a duplicate of our world at the chemical level but to have a radically different physics. You can't make logical deductions from high levels to low levels but you can make predictions at higher levels that collapse / don't make sense at lower levels.
For example... If I tell you that I'm going to order 500 shares in general motors (psychological level) then you can predict something about my behaviour (that I'm going to order 500 shares in general motors) that can't be predicted from any other level of explanation. There are many (physically) different ways of ordering 500 shares in general motors. I could pick up the phone with my left hand or with my right hand or I could get my secretary to phone for me. I could send a fax or an email or whatever. Those are very different behaviours that are only the same kind of behaviour on one level of explanation. You can't capture the notion on a lower level. To drop to the level of physics... Loses informational content.
But...
It does seem strange that:
- The lower level facts fix the higher level facts
and
- Sometimes the higher level facts give more information than the lower level facts (as a matter of principle and this would be the case for idealised reasoners with perfect information)Or...
Am I completely nuts?
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 1:02:08
> Sorry, what was the groundbreaking discovery?
>
> That if you take a bunch of people with OCD and do brain imaging... Then you figure the averages across the population... Then you decide on your colour scheme... And you do the same with people... Without OCD? With another dx? Then your pretty pics look different?
>
> Er... How does that help?
Well true insults aside to peer reviewed journalism and key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD by groundbreaking research when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorder, it illustrated for the first time that OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings. That if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
> I just don't understand what the brain imaging shows. Also... If you take a person with OCD chances are their brain is within normal range. It is just averages across populations that have been deemed to be different (and are there systematic differences between averages across different populations?)
2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime. That's a significant percentage. That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing. I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same. People with OCD do not have the same particular brain structure, nor do people with Schizophrenia, nor other key illnesses, all due to increasing abilitiy to image the brain in more precise fashion. I'm not going to argue deities over science, its an endless discussion.
I agree with the idea that the patient is not just a number or a statistic, but biological reductionist models help us understand complex systems in intricate ways never thought before. If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover, along with stem cell lines and other issues that this country is pathetically behind in the 21st century at the moment compared to other western societies. But I digress -- we have free will, and I feel you have the free will to believe what you may wish-- Jay
Posted by SLS on September 1, 2006, at 7:20:19
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
Although I cannot add anything to the discussion regarding the paradigms being offered, I just wanted to report that my brain was imaged using a FDG P.E.T. scan at the NIH under various conditions, including some standard task performances. At the time, I was in a severely vegetative depressive state as a presentation of bipolar disorder. Compared to controls, my entire cerebral cortex was underactive as was portrayed by the colors blue and green. I did not suffer from depressed mood, melancholia, suicidal ideation, grieving, or any other type of negative thinking that I can conceive of. In fact, my mind was so inactive, I didn't think about much of anything. I spent much of my time staring at walls. My variety of depression comprises anergia, loss of interest, amotivation, low libido, hypersomnia, anhedonia, cognitive imparairments, slowed thinking, memory imparairments, psychomotor retardation, and other vegetative symptoms. At this point, my condition is not driven by psychosocial factors.
- Scott
Posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 4:27:43
> Well true insults aside...
I'm not intending to insult anybody.
> key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD...
That is precisely the question I'm asking: How has neuroimaging 'helped save the lives' of anyone with OCD? How is finding neurological differences (across averages of populations) of any relevance to anything?
> when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorder
*Just* a "neurotic" disorder? What do you take to be the "neurotic" vs "legitimate" disorders (I expect that is the distinction you are trying to make)? Do you really mean to imply that somehow disorders with pretty neuroimaging (across populations) are somehow *legit* whereas disorders without pretty neuroimagine (across populations) are somehow *neurotic* / non legit?
> OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings.
Across averages of populations. Can you hear the difference? I don't know how you define *normal* compared to *averages across populations* but my bet is that even when you find differences in the averages across populations that doesn't entail anything at all for the neurological detail within the individual. If you really think that neurological differences are the marker for different mental illnesses then you will find that... Making this up... Say, half of the individuals with OCD have no significant differences neurologically than people without OCD. There aren't neurological markers. It is as simple as that. You could of course maintain that there *are* differences it is just that we haven't found them as yet. That is to make a significant empirical bet on something that we currently have no evidence for, however. If you scanned peoples brains with schizophrenia and OCD fact is that most of them... Would fall in line with controls. There are a few individuals who deviate radically enough to throw the whole populations average off course (which is why it is done on the level of populations and not individuals). Most people with mental illness have... Surprisingly (perhaps) normal brains. So much the worse for... Notions of mental illness. Lol.
> if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol. The actual difference between levels of activation varies depending on how you define *statistically significant difference*. How do phobics brains *light up* when they are presented with a picture of the object they are phobic of? How does that compare to OCD controls?
> 2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime.So their brains differ from normal and then... Spontaneously switch back again?
> That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing.
How has brain imaging helped with that? OCD is defined by behavioural criteria not by neuroimaging criteria and neuroimaging is a hopeless predictor of behaviour.
> I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same.
But people are different. Both normal people and different people with the same dx. If you are hoping for similarities across different people with the same dx... You tend to find there is considerable variation across *normal* brains so fairly unsurprisingly you find the same considerable variation across OCD brains or the brains of populations with any dx you care to think of...
> I agree with the idea that the patient is not just a number or a statistic,
Or an average...
> but biological reductionist models help us understand complex systems in intricate ways never thought before.
Do they? That is precisely what I am calling into question. The point at issue is:
How much do biological reductionist models actually help us understand
1) mental illness across population types
2) my particular variety of difficulty?> If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
We aren't talking about cancer we are talking about mental illness. You might have something approaching a litmus test for cancer but there is nothing comperable to that with respect to mental illness. If you neuroimage someones brain you can't use that for dx. So... How much does neuroimaging help accurate dx of mental illness???
> And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover...
Well that is the question really. I say... Not a lot.
Posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 14:44:55
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
> > Well true insults aside...
>
> I'm not intending to insult anybody.Well if you knew the individuals you would be, but that's beside the point.
>
> > key scientific individuals whose intellectual product have helped save the lives of thousands of people with OCD...>
> > when at a time it was just a "neurotic" disorderBefore the book "The Boy Who Couldn't Stop Washing" came out in the late 80s.
> > OCD was clearly based on biological underpinnings.
Most people with mental illness have... Surprisingly (perhaps) normal brains. So much the worse for... Notions of mental illness. Lol.We're not arguing whether people are "normal" or have "normal" brains, normal is an artificial concept -- we're talking about brains that are different to your "average" control that you are going on about.
> > if you gave a sufferer a dirty rag and a control the same, areas of the brain normally not thought to possess suchprocessing energy light up, for example.
>
> The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.This is not funny to sufferers of OCD. Please be civil about it.
>
> > 2% of the population will have an OCD breakthrough at least once in their lifetime.
>
> So their brains differ from normal and then... Spontaneously switch back again?No. It seems to me you have not ever studied OCD. 2% will have it for their ENTIRE lifetime. And yes, there are outside triggers that influence the biological switch that turns on. Most frequently puberty but can be other traumatic eras. Then things may recede and come back in another format, triggered by other events.
> > That's what brain imaging has increasingly helped in demonstrably showing.
>
> How has brain imaging helped with that? OCD is defined by behavioural criteria not byOCD is a behavioural form if you are referring that we have free will, OCD sufferers for the most part except a small percent which fall in the psychotic spectrum know what they are doing. Nonetheless their brains will light up like a candle in the caudate nucleus.
> > I can't argue circular logic that if everybody is the same then everybody is the same.
>
> But people are different. Both normal people and different people with the same dx. If you are hoping for similarities across different people with the same dx...Of course people are different, slightly, in their brains and genes. I could even make a profound statement that would be considered racist that there are genetic variations and things that can be imaged across race. But in the same light, OCD is experienced regardless of ethnicity or location. Its just a question of quality of medicine and studies.
> How much do biological reductionist models actually help us understand
> 1) mental illness across population typesSee above
> 2) my particular variety of difficulty?
I don't know what you suffer from.
>
> > If you believe brain imaging has no basis, I cannot argue science over pseudorationalization. MRIs clearly show an increasingly accurate diagnosis as to whether cancer exists, etc.
>
> We aren't talking about cancer we are talking about mental illness. You might have something approaching a litmus test for cancer but there is nothing comperable to that with respect to mental illness. If you neuroimage someones brain you can't use that for dx. So... How much does neuroimaging help accurate dx of mental illness???Without getting profoundly annoyed and uncivil, I have never said they diagnose illnesses -- YET. They are RESEARCH tools that help us in better diagnostics of future methods of treatment.
>
> > And when SPECT and other technologies are perfected, who knows what we will discover...
>
> Well that is the question really. I say... Not a lot.I beg to differ. I am also ending this argument because I cannot argue that the world is round or flat without saying some rather uncivil statements. I do believe this is a partial ruse thread, however as I said I am civil and you have free will as a human being hopefully in a democratic area to believe as you wish.
Tidings-- Jay
Posted by SLS on September 1, 2006, at 16:43:00
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
> The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary.
They are not arbitrary. Red is hot and blue is cold.
> Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.
I would not laugh at your image if your cortex were portrayed as blue. It would be damning.
- Scott
Posted by finelinebob on September 1, 2006, at 19:41:35
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » finelinebob, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 2:12:36
> We might have a different world view...
>
> - Social
> - Psychological (beliefs, desires, emotions, hopes etc)
> - Biological
> - Chemical
> - PhysicalWell, I'd say that there is little difference between cultural, social and psychological other than a factor of scale or localization;but those sitting on top of the other three from a non-dualist point of view makes perfect sense.
We do differ on a few key points. If what you mean by "fact" is an indisputable truth, I'd say you can have those in logics and semantics but not in science. No scientific "truth" is indisputable, and no indisputable truth is scientific. If you take an empiricist's definition of a "fact" conforming to a statement verified by objective observation, again I would have to say you can have no truths because science is based on falsifiability and not verification, and objectivity is a fiction since all observation is theory-laden -- you cannot approach a scientific experiment without it being couched in an explanatory framework.A closely related second point is that rationality is also a fiction based on the epistemology of empiricism. But both fictions (rationality and fact) are **useful** fictions as long as you remain within the boundary conditions of science. Again, that is the essence of a model -- it is a useful fiction.
But, to continue the thought experiment and acknowledging that some "Primary Mover" started physics off on its merry way some 13.5 billion years ago...
> So...
>
> If that is right. As a claim about the way the world is then we might be inclined to think that explanation should bottom out at the physical level as if we knew everything there was to know at the level of physics we would thereby know everything there is to know at higher levels of explanation.
And assuming perfect replication and rigid determinism of a higher level by its predecessor, then yes, a theory of everything would be able to explain everything at all levels. "42" would make sense.
> Or...
>
> One might think that the levels of explanation are autonomous in the sense that you lose information when you drop from a high level to a lower level of explanation.
Which is not at all inconsistent with the bottom-up approach as long as you do not assume rigid determinism and perfect replication.Even at the level of subatomic physics, tho, we do not have these conditions. "Reality" is probablistic, not deterministic. We see things such as quantum tunneling, paired electron spin experiments that can only (now) be explained as information travelling at speeds indistinguishable from instantaneous. We have "virtual pairs" of particles and their anti-particles popping in and out of existence all the time, one consequence being the "evaporation" of black holes -- matter escaping the inescapable. As quoted before, "The world may not be as real as we think it is."
I don't know the chemical equivalents, but obviously in biology we have random mutations based on probabiltiy and by interactions with external agents (carcinogens, energetic photons).
Take it up to the cultural-social-psychological, and not only do we have misunderstandings, we have intentional differences of opinion. There is no pure social transmission of meaning if the transmitter or receiver "malfunction" or if they intend to be subversive.
We have chaos, not unfettered replication, at every level and in-between.
To make the story even more interesting, we have acheived a state where we can now turn the tables, starting with civil disorder back into antiquity. Out of such disorder came the freedom of intellect. Out of the development of such intellect, we can now alter genomes, "create" molecules that do not exist in nature, and we can even poke and prod individual atoms around to form such useful, unnatural constructs as carbon nanotubes and buckyballs, or even engage in trivial matters such as spelling out "IBM" in atoms.
What can be construed as a "loss of inforamation" may simply (lol, what a choice of word) be an indicaion of the quantum nature of "meaning" and of how chaos plays a role at all levels.
> It does seem strange that:
>
> - The lower level facts fix the higher level facts
In a probablistic view, it's not strange at all. Neither are the exceptions to that rule -- they are improbable, but not impossible.
> - Sometimes the higher level facts give more information than the lower level facts (as a matter of principle and this would be the case for idealised reasoners with perfect information)No need for idealised reasoners. Crushed rocks make a brick. Many bricks make a house. The habitation of houses by people make homes. Collections of homes make a city, and so on.
Higher-level concepts in your system exhibit a one-to-many relationship with lower-level phenomena, not a one-to-one match.
> Or...
>
> Am I completely nuts?This **is** Babble, after all. Alternative hypotheses cannot be ruled out. =^P
Getting back to models as useful fictions. Brain imaging allows for the testing and measurement of models of the mind. Some people see progress and even evidence of their usefulness increasing. Seems like they haven't reached a "critical mass" of usefulness for you. Whether the "colors" are arbitrary or not, they are simply representations of difference, and its the differences in what is being measured that provides support for one view while, perhaps, ruling out a competing view.
Modern physics began with apparatus such as Milliken's Oil Drop Experiment, but look where it is now. Comparatively, we may be back as far as Newton in terms of understanding the brain.
Posted by SLS on September 2, 2006, at 6:33:49
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » yxibow, posted by Estella on September 1, 2006, at 13:41:58
I don't see why it cannot be understood that mental illnesses can result from abnormalities or perturbations that can occur at any point along the network of processes from the chemical to the behavioral. It is true that the mind is the product of emergent properties, but it is, afterall, comprised of the building blocks of life. If the blocks are defective, the whole thing comes falling down. Fortunately, both the reductionist and the psychosocial perspectives are in place to research problems involving the microscopic and the macroscopic. Of course, there are people who integrate both into their approach to understanding mental illness. It's not that hard.
- Scott
Posted by Estella on September 2, 2006, at 11:58:27
In reply to Re: Biopsychosocial vs Biological Reductionism » Estella, posted by yxibow on September 1, 2006, at 14:44:55
> > The colours that are chosen to represent different levels of activation are completely arbitrary. Researchers tend to choose the colours that make up the most impressive visual display. Lol.
> This is not funny to sufferers of OCD. Please be civil about it.I wasn't laughing at people with OCD. I was intending to convey... Nervous laughter about the information conveyed by pictures of fMRI's more generally.
> It seems to me you have not ever studied OCD.Thats right, I haven't.
> Nonetheless their brains will light up like a candle in the caudate nucleus.
Whose brains? Every person with a dx of OCD? Is that really right? The colour scheme is arbitrary but the chosen colour scheme does indeed convey 'light up like a candle'. I wonder what that means?
> I could even make a profound statement that would be considered racist that there are genetic variations and things that can be imaged across race.
There are more noticible differences (in genes etc) of people from within a race than there are noticible differences (in genes etc) between races.
I wonder whether it might be the same with the brains of people with a particular kind of mental disorder.
> But in the same light, OCD is experienced regardless of ethnicity or location.
There isn't variation in prevalence rates?
> Without getting profoundly annoyed and uncivil...
Thanks for not doing that.
> I do believe this is a partial ruse thread
Please don't jump to conclusions about my intention.
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